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Executive Summary 
 
evidence suggests that an HIV vaccine is possible, and funding for HIV vaccine research and 
development (R&D) has increased substantially in recent years. The speed of progress 
toward an HIV vaccine will depend on the management of the effort as well as on its scale, 
however, and organizational issues have been the subject of vigorous debate. With this 
paper, we seek to shed light on these debates by examining the history of vaccine 
development, as well as some examples of large R&D initiatives in other areas. We focus on 
two issues: the roles of the public and private sectors, and the merits and risks of strong 
central direction of R&D. We also consider the scientific, regulatory, and institutional 
changes that complicate extrapolation from past experience to the case of HIV vaccines. 
Our analysis draws on extensive interviews with experts in the field as well as a literature 
review. 
 
Historical models of vaccine development 
It is often asserted that the private sector possesses unique capacities in vaccine R&D and 
that greater involvement of industry, especially the large pharmaceutical companies, is 
essential to developing an HIV vaccine. To evaluate this claim, we analyze the institutional 
settings in which innovative vaccines have been successfully developed. In particular, we 
identify the organizations primarily responsible for each stage (vaccine design, development 
and clinical trials, manufacturing and licensing) of the development of vaccines licensed 
since 1945. By classifying these organizations by sector (public, private nonprofit, or private 
for profit), we define four basic “models” of vaccine development. 
 
 Predominantly private sector development. This model is exemplified by the 
hepatitis B (HBV) vaccine, licensed by Merck in 1981. Although earlier work done 
in academic labs suggested a strategy, the vaccine was designed, tested, and 
manufactured by Merck. 
 Public (or nonprofit) sector vaccine design, with handover to the private sector for 
trials and manufacturing. The human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine is an example 
of this common pattern. Several university labs independently developed the “virus-
like particles” on which the vaccine is based and then licensed their ideas to the 
private sector. Merck, whose vaccine was licensed in 2006, and GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK), whose vaccine should reach the market in 2007, conducted process 
development, clinical trials, and manufacturing. 
 Predominantly public-sector development. The influenza vaccine, developed in the 
1940s, typifies this model. The U.S. Army designed the vaccine and carried out 
clinical trials, although vaccine manufacture was contracted to industry. 
 Coordination by a nonprofit entity. The Salk polio vaccine is so far the only 
example of this organizational pattern. The vaccine was designed in a university lab 
and manufactured by industry, but under the close supervision of the National 
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (NFIP), which also oversaw clinical trials. This 
model may become more important because investments in product development 
public-private partnerships (PDPs) have grown dramatically over the past decade. 
 
Our historical review demonstrates that universities, public agencies, and private firms have 
divided the tasks of vaccine R&D in a number of ways. Basic research has in most cases 
A preventive HIV vaccine offers the best hope for ending the AIDS pandemic. Scientific 
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been conducted at universities or research institutes, often supported by public funding. At 
the other end of the pipeline, almost all the vaccines that we consider were initially 
manufactured by industry, although the public sector produces many generic vaccines 
outside the U.S. Thus vaccine development has generally involved a handover from the 
public (or academic) sector to industry; the various models differ primarily in when the 
handover occurs. 
 
When the entire period since 1945 is considered, no particular model dominates: six 
vaccines were designed and tested by private industry, 16 were designed in the 
academic/public sector and handed to the private sector for clinical trials, and nine were 
taken to the production stage in the public sector. Moreover, no particular model (or sector) 
is more strongly associated than any other with innovation or with development of more 
“difficult” vaccines. In recent years, however, a standard model of vaccine development has 
dominated, in which promising candidates are developed by university labs and biotech 
firms and then licensed to big pharma for clinical trials, licensing, and manufacture. Of the 
20 vaccines on our list that were licensed since 1980, 18 were carried through trials at least 
partially by industry. The skills and experience required to develop large-scale 
manufacturing processes, as well as to carry out licensing trials, currently reside almost 
exclusively at a handful of large firms. 
 
Recent history suggests that the research and innovation necessary for an HIV vaccine are 
likely to come from university labs and biotech firms rather than from big pharma. 
Moreover, although the involvement of industry in trials—especially trials to support 
licensure—is highly desirable, growing experience in HIV vaccine trials should allow the 
public sector to test promising candidates if necessary. The expertise of the established 
vaccine firms will be crucial to manufacturing and licensing a vaccine, however. We argue 
that it makes sense to continue to strengthen the capacity of the public and nonprofit sectors 
to design and test HIV vaccines while preparing to engage the private sector on mutually 
attractive terms once proof of concept has been established. 
 
The organization of R&D efforts: lessons from beyond vaccines 
Some have argued that competitive pressures, misaligned incentives, and lack of 
communication in the HIV vaccine field have resulted in duplication of effort in some areas 
and insufficient attention to others. We ask whether the HIV vaccine field should seek to 
mimic—to the extent possible in a very different institutional context—the highly 
centralized organization that characterized major national R&D initiatives in the past, such 
as the Manhattan Project. We call this approach to organizing R&D “mission mode” and 
define it by four characteristics: strong commitment backed by sufficient resources, a clear 
and politically compelling goal, centralized leadership with control over resources, and tight 
focus on a restricted set of tasks. We emphasize the third and fourth features, which 
distinguish mission mode from alternative ways of organizing large R&D initiatives. We 
briefly describe two examples of past mission mode efforts and then consider the 
implications of these experiences for the HIV vaccine field. 
 
The Manhattan Project. The Manhattan Project refers to the American effort to develop the 
first nuclear weapons during World War II. Although the theoretical basis for an atomic 
weapon had already been established when the project began, the necessary fissionable 
material had never been produced on a large scale, and many daunting technological 
problems remained to be solved. A central laboratory for all of the project’s theoretical and 
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experimental work was established at Los Alamos, NM, and participating scientists were 
required to focus exclusively on directly relevant lines of research. At the same time, the 
project’s leadership assumed tight control over efforts to produce fissionable material, 
choosing among competing approaches and moving rapidly to full-scale production. 
 
The Manhattan Project developed the bombs that exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
less than three years after the project was launched. Strong central control (and pervasive 
secrecy) undoubtedly contributed to this outcome by allowing decisions to be made rapidly, 
by focusing effort on the chosen approaches, and by coordinating the many necessary tasks.  
 
The War on Cancer. In January 1971, President Nixon called for an appropriation of 
US$100 million to launch the War on Cancer, saying “the time has come in America when 
the same kind of concentrated effort that split the atom and took man to the moon should 
be turned toward conquering this dread disease.” A national panel recommended strong 
central direction by the National Cancer Institute (NCI), a systematic plan of attack 
focusing largely on applied research, and a large increase in resources. This broad 
conception of the National Cancer Program quickly faded, however, and progress toward 
the program’s goals was disappointing: more than US$23 billion had been appropriated by 
1993, yet age-adjusted mortality rates from cancer were higher than they had been in 1970. 
Although the causes of failure are disputed, the sheer complexity of the cancer problem and 
lack of knowledge about which areas would reward more research are seen as the major 
reasons that the ambitious goals of the 1971 act were not met. 
 
Although it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions about mission mode from two 
examples, these cases suggest that the success of this organizational form may depend on the 
nature of the R&D challenge. We argue that mission mode is appropriate only when the 
way forward is relatively clear and when the necessary development work is intrinsically 
large in scale. In contrast, when the best path to success is not clear, centralized decision-
making can suppress innovation and the development of new strategies. There is therefore a 
trade-off between the efficiency of mission mode and the greater innovative potential of a 
more dispersed, less structured organization of R&D. 
 
In retrospect, the Manhattan Project appears to meet the two criteria for mission mode, 
while the War on Cancer does not. Not enough was known about cancer in the early 1970s 
to justify a focus on one or a few approaches. Moreover, most cancer research is relatively 
small in scale and can be done in many places at once. 
 
We argue that the path to an HIV vaccine is not sufficiently clear to justify primary reliance 
on a highly centralized approach, especially in the early stages of R&D, and that there is a 
real risk of narrowing the field's focus too far. Nonetheless, new, larger-scale approaches 
that focus on key outstanding challenges and incorporate features of mission mode can be 
important components of a diverse global effort, as long as sufficient resources remain 
available for exploring currently unpopular avenues of research. True mission mode as 
epitomized by the Manhattan Project does not seem appropriate for these stages, although 
voluntary measures to enhance cooperation, including many of those advocated by the 
Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise, could enhance cooperation and R&D efficiency while still 
preserving independent initiative. 
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Vaccine efficacy trials, in contrast, are by their nature large, highly structured undertakings 
involving thousands of subjects and costing tens of millions of dollars. Moreover, trial 
capacity is clearly limited and will remain so even with substantial efforts to support new 
sites in the developing world. This is a compelling argument for adopting a more systematic 
and coordinated approach to choosing which trials to conduct. Innovative trial designs 
permitting rapid screening of candidates could constitute an important element of a new 
approach and could contribute as well to easing the demands on trial capacity. In addition, 
greater coordination of large-scale efficacy trials themselves could allow for better 
comparison of candidates and a more efficient path to an effective first-generation product. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Twenty-five years after the first cases of AIDS were documented, the global HIV pandemic 
has become one of the greatest public health crises facing the world. Nearly 40 million 
people were living with HIV at the end of 2005, and more than 4 million new infections 
occur each year, 95% of them in developing countries (UNAIDS 2006).  
 
Despite significant progress over the past decade in expanding prevention and treatment 
programs, the number of new infections continues to climb each year. The AIDS crisis 
requires a comprehensive and integrated response, balancing the expansion of current 
programs with the development of better tools for the future. Unless the rate of new 
undermine commitments to universal access for treatment and potentially to other 
expenditures for global health and development. 
 
Funding for HIV vaccine research and development (R&D) has increased substantially in 
recent years. But progress toward an HIV vaccine depends on more than the volume of 
resources and the scale of scientific work: the organization and management of this effort 
matters too. A better understanding of which kinds of organizations are best suited for 
which roles in vaccine development, of the most productive balance of collaboration and 
competition at different stages of the process, and of whether and how mechanisms for 
coordinating the overall effort could accelerate the search for a vaccine and improve the 
chances of success. These issues have been discussed since the earliest days of HIV vaccine 
research but have taken on a greater urgency with the growing institutional complexity of 
the field. 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to ongoing discussions about the priorities, organization, and 
management of the HIV vaccine field by examining the history of vaccine development and, 
to a lesser extent, large R&D initiatives outside the vaccine field.  
 
1.1 Status of the HIV vaccine quest 
 
Evidence suggests that an HIV vaccine is possible: cellular immune responses typically 
suppress the virus for up to a decade, and both live-attenuated vaccines and broadly 
neutralizing antibodies have been shown to protect monkeys. More than 30 HIV vaccine 
candidates are undergoing clinical trials now, including two being assessed in large-scale 
efficacy trials. Yet researchers working on HIV vaccines face a number of critical challenges, 
including the hypervariability of the virus and the difficulty of eliciting neutralizing 
antibodies against it. HIV, a retrovirus, hides within cells, meaning that the window of 
opportunity for a vaccine to cut off infection could be as short as seven to ten days. HIV 
also attacks and kills a critical class of immune cells that could otherwise help control 
infection.  
  
Standard vaccine strategies attempt to mimic natural infection, but broadly neutralizing 
antibodies are not generated in response to HIV infection. No correlates of immunity have 
been identified, and no ideal animal model exists for HIV infection. Candidates can thus 
only be adequately evaluated in human clinical trials, which are expensive and logistically 
difficult. Partially as a result of these challenges, there are major gaps in the current HIV 
infections is lowered through better prevention, the escalating costs of the pandemic will 
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vaccine pipeline. For instance, virtually no candidates elicit broadly neutralizing antibodies 
or mucosal immune responses in humans. For more information on the special challenges to 
creating an HIV vaccine, see Box 1 on page 8. 
 
1.2 Players in HIV vaccine R&D 
 
Funding for HIV vaccine R&D has increased steadily over the years, reaching US$759 
million per year in 2005. More than three-quarters of this total comes from the U.S. 
government, while the private sector accounts for about 10% (HIV Vaccines and 
Microbicides Resource Tracking Working Group 2006). Recent major new commitments 
included US$287 million over five years from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to 
establish 11 vaccine discovery consortia and up to US$300 million over five years from the 
U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) to establish the Center 
for HIV/AIDS Vaccine Immunology (CHAVI) (Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise 2005). 
 
The U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), the largest single funder of HIV vaccine 
R&D, supports basic and applied research as well as clinical trials. Basic research is largely 
funded through investigator-initiated R01 grants, while much vaccine design work 
sponsored by the NIH is done through collaborative agreements and contracts. Important 
work is also done in-house by the NIAID’s Dale and Betty Bumpers Vaccine Research 
Center (VRC). 
 
Other public sector funders include the European Union (EU), which provides grants to 
various groups in Europe and has also established the European and Developing Countries 
Clinical Trials Partnership (EDCTP) to support trial site capacity building. Many other 
individual countries support HIV vaccine research in academic and government 
laboratories. 
 
Four large pharmaceutical companies (GlaxoSmithKline or GSK, Merck, sanofi-aventis, and 
Wyeth) are involved in HIV vaccine R&D, although this work is often funded by the public 
sector or by nonprofit organizations. A number of small biotech companies, most in the 
U.S. or Europe, have developed or are developing vaccine platforms or candidates, some of 
which have moved into clinical trials. 
 
The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), a product development public-private 
partnership (PDP), receives funding from governments and other sources to accelerate the 
search for an HIV vaccine. IAVI directs and finances a portfolio of research projects and 
clinical trials in partnership with both private sector firms and academic labs. At the same 
time, it works to build worldwide political and financial support for the HIV vaccine field 
as a whole. 
 
The Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise, first proposed in 2003 and endorsed by the Group of 
Eight major industrialized nations (G8) in 2004, is made up of a wide variety of partners 
from the public, private, academic, and nonprofit sectors and is aimed at mobilizing 
resources for the HIV vaccine field, increasing coordination among researchers, and 
addressing the key problems identified in its 2005 Scientific Strategic Plan. The Enterprise 
does not conduct or fund research but is rather intended as a forum for partners to decide 
on the best ways to move forward, including targeting resources to priorities in the scientific 
strategic plan (Coordinating Committee of the Global HIV/AIDS Vaccine Enterprise 2005). 
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1.3 Major themes 
 
Despite substantial increases in funding and the creation of innovative partnerships and 
organizations devoted to HIV vaccines, many players involved in HIV vaccine R&D, 
including IAVI itself, have argued that the field suffers from duplication of effort, misplaced 
priorities, and insufficient focus on applied research and rapid testing of promising 
candidates (Coordinating Committee of the Global HIV/AIDS Vaccine Enterprise 2005; 
IAVI 2006). Some believe that these deficiencies could be remedied by greater coordination 
of R&D efforts. Another common contention is that only industry, especially the big 
pharmaceutical companies, has the discipline and experience that later stages of vaccine 
development require and so must be persuaded to become more involved. Others have 
argued that until it is clear which approach will lead to success, a loosely organized effort 
that fosters independent thinking and healthy competition is most likely to generate the 
necessary innovation. They note that academic labs and small biotech companies are 
probably best equipped to pursue this kind of exploratory work. 
 
This paper is an attempt to explore these questions. It will focus primarily on two related 
but distinct issues: the roles of the public and private sectors in vaccine development, and 
the advantages and disadvantages of a centrally directed, narrowly focused approach to 
large R&D challenges, which we will call “mission mode.” In addressing the first issue, we 
develop a simple taxonomy of successful vaccine development efforts based on the sector 
that carried out critical stages of the process. In discussing mission mode, we try to examine 
the conditions under which such an approach to organizing R&D accelerates progress. In 
both cases, we explore the implications of our findings for the HIV vaccine field. 
 
We note here that IAVI has often distinguished between “industrial” and “academic” 
models of R&D said to typify, respectively, product development in large pharmaceutical 
firms and publicly funded research in university labs.1 Although there is considerable 
overlap between the issues underlying this distinction and those addressed here, this paper 
does not attempt to better define the “industrial model” by analyzing how firms manage 
R&D internally, nor does it assume that applying such a model to the HIV vaccine field as a 
whole would be appropriate or possible. We discuss some aspects of the industrial versus 
academic distinction in Section III on mission mode. 
 
This paper rests on the premise that vaccine history can help guide the development of HIV 
vaccines. We recognize, however, that both the science and the business of vaccines have 
changed in fundamental ways since most of the vaccines now in wide use were developed. 
We discuss some of these changes when we analyze the implications of historical precedents 
for vaccine R&D today. Moreover, the scientific obstacles to an HIV vaccine are different 
from those faced by earlier vaccine developers, and in some ways more daunting. Although 
our focus is not on the science of HIV vaccines, we raise some of these differences when 
they are relevant to the organization of research and development. 
 
                                            
1 The terms “industrial” and “academic” have been used rather loosely to describe a variety of R&D 
types. This terminology tends to blur important distinctions between R&D stages and between 
decision-making within and among organizations. 
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1.4 Methods and organization 
 
The analysis and conclusions presented in this paper are built on two sources of data: 
interviews and a literature review.  
 
We conducted structured interviews with experts in vaccine research, development, and 
manufacturing, as well as with leaders in HIV science and advocacy. The goal of the 
interviews was to identify factors that had contributed to the successful development of 
vaccines in the past and to consider how those factors might apply to the HIV vaccine field 
today (see Annexes II and III). These discussions informed all aspects of our analysis; some 
comments from the interviews are presented in boxes throughout the paper.  
 
Box 1. Is HIV different? 
 
It is sometimes argued that the challenges to developing an HIV vaccine are so different, in 
nature and magnitude, that little can be learned from the development of other vaccines. 
There is no doubt that the challenges are substantial. For example, nearly all current vaccines 
protect against pathogens that cause acute infections and can be cleared by the immune 
system. But no one has been known to recover from HIV and acquire immunity to 
subsequent infection, so researchers cannot base a vaccine on natural immune responses. Nor 
can they use simple live-attenuated or killed whole virus vaccines, which have been successful 
in the past even in the absence of information on immune responses, because they are 
considered too risky for HIV. 
 
In addition, infectious agents for which vaccines have been developed tend to be relatively 
stable over time, so the immune response generated by a vaccine can protect against the real 
pathogen later. But HIV exists in many strains and is capable of extremely rapid and varied 
mutation. There is no guarantee that a vaccine could protect against all strains circulating in 
a given population, or that the virus would not soon escape from a vaccine in widespread use. 
 
Assessing vaccine candidates is unusually difficult for HIV vaccines. There is no convenient 
animal model for HIV, so candidates can only be fully assessed in human clinical trials. In 
addition, researchers have not yet identified “correlates of protection,” simple measures of 
effective immune response that would greatly simplify the testing of candidates.  
 
Although these obstacles are serious, most have been overcome in the past. For example, 
many vaccines were developed before immune correlates of protection could be analyzed; no 
animal model existed for (among others) rotavirus, measles, or mumps. The cancer-causing 
strains of human papillomavirus establish persistent infections that are not typically cleared 
by the immune system. And influenza rapidly mutates from year to year, necessitating new 
versions of the vaccine. Safe, effective vaccines for all these diseases are available today.  
 
Moreover, the unusual difficulty of the HIV vaccine challenge does not mean that previous 
ways of organizing the search are not appropriate, only that more resources may be required 
or that the probability of success is lower. The unique features of HIV mean that some 
previous scientific approaches may not be useful, but nothing suggests that the challenge is so 
qualitatively different that the experience of past vaccine efforts cannot present useful lessons 
for how the HIV vaccine effort should be organized. 
9 
Models of vaccine R&D were defined through a literature review; the development of 
vaccines licensed since 1945 was analyzed in detail, with a particular emphasis on the 
institutional setting in which critical stages of development occurred. A small number of 
vaccines chosen as exemplars of particular R&D models were explored in more detail. 
These results are presented and analyzed in Section II, which focuses on the roles of the 
public and private sectors in vaccine development. Section III addresses the arguments for 
and against greater focus and centralized control (mission mode) in large R&D initiatives. 
In both sections we explore the implications of our conclusions for the HIV vaccine field. 
 10 
11 
II. Historical models of vaccine development 
 
2.1 Vaccine basics 
 
Vaccine history and major types of vaccines 
 
The first vaccine was discovered in 1796, when Edward Jenner noticed that exposure to a 
smallpox-like pathogen offered protection against smallpox itself. After smallpox, no other 
vaccines were developed for nearly a century.  
 
Elucidation of germ theory and the development of bacterial culture techniques in the 1880s 
and 1890s resulted in the development of a wave of new vaccines. Louis Pasteur theorized 
that exposing bacterial pathogens to environmental insults could weaken or "attenuate" 
them, leading to the first attenuated vaccine against anthrax (though it was not intended for 
humans). Aside from the bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccine against tuberculosis, 
however, very few attenuated bacterial vaccines were successful, though the attenuation 
strategy was used for the first viral vaccine against rabies in 1885 (Baker and Katz 2004). 
Bacterial culture proved more useful for the development of killed bacterial vaccines, 
including vaccines against typhoid fever, cholera, plague, and pertussis (whooping cough). 
Few of these vaccines were effective, however, and only a few are still in use today.  
 
Recognition of the extracellular toxins released by diphtheria-causing bacteria, which could 
then be inactivated, resulted in the licensure and widespread use of diphtheria and tetanus 
toxoids, both of which are still in use (Baker and Katz 2004). The discovery of viral 
propagation in embryonated chicken eggs in 1931 led to vaccines against yellow fever and 
influenza.  
 
In 1949, a team at the Children’s Hospital of Boston discovered viral propagation in cell 
culture, a critical new avenue for developing antiviral vaccines that won a Nobel Prize for 
the researchers and led directly to Jonas Salk’s development of a killed polio vaccine. Cell 
culture proved to be an excellent means of attenuating viruses as well as propagating them, 
and attenuated virus vaccines were rapidly (and relatively easily) developed against polio, 
measles, mumps, and rubella. 
 
Following these successes, a relatively quiet period of new vaccine development occurred 
through the 1970s. Exceptions were pneumococcal and meningococcal vaccines directed 
against polysaccharide components of the bacterial capsules, based on a technique that had 
been developed in the 1940s. In 1981, a hepatitis B (HBV) vaccine based on an antigen 
derived from the blood plasma of HBV carriers appeared on the market; this unusual 
strategy has yet to be repeated for any other vaccine. 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the advent of molecular biology led to the development of a new 
generation of vaccines. A protein-conjugated capsular polysaccharide vaccine against 
Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) was licensed in 1987, and this technique has since 
been used to create improved meningococcal and pneumococcal vaccines as well. 
 
Genetic engineering techniques resulted in two recombinant subunit vaccines—against HBV 
and Lyme disease—although the Lyme vaccine has since been taken off the market. The new 
vaccine against human papillomavirus (HPV) uses a recombinant platform to generate a 
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“virus-like particle” (VLP) that elicits strong immunity. A recombinant influenza vaccine, 
which does not rely on virus propagation in eggs, is expected in 2007 or 2008. Finally, 
recombinant vector vaccines have shown theoretical promise, though none has yet been 
licensed (Hilleman 2002). 
 
Table 1. First examples of different types of vaccines, by year 
Method of making vaccine First example  Year available 
Related animal virus Smallpox 1798 
Chemical attenuation Rabies 1885 
Inactivated whole bacteria Typhoid 1896 
Toxoid Diphtheria  1923 
Attenuation by passage in chick embryos Yellow fever  1932 
Inactivated whole virus Influenza 1945 
Attenuation by cell culture passage Polio (oral trivalent) 1963 
Capsular polysaccharide Meningococcal 1974 
Viral subunit Hepatitis B (plasma-derived) 1981 
Attenuation by deletion mutation Ty21a oral typhoid 1981 
Expressed recombinant viral subunit Hepatitis B (recombinant) 1986 
Protein-conjugated capsular 
polysaccharide 
Hib conjugate 1988 
Purified bacterial protein Acellular pertussis 1991 
Expressed recombinant bacterial protein Lyme disease 1998 
Virus-like particle HPV 2006 
Sources: Hilleman 2000; Plotkin 2005. 
 
Stages of vaccine R&D 
 
Although vaccine development does not always follow a conventional progression, this 
paper identifies four standard stages of R&D (National Vaccine Advisory Committee 
1999).  
 
 Basic research includes the identification of the disease-causing organism and its 
propagation in the laboratory, studies of disease pathology and natural immune 
response, and epidemiological surveillance. 
 Applied research and vaccine design include the identification of a strategy to elicit 
immunity and development of vaccine candidates, as well as preclinical evaluation of 
safety and immunogenicity (typically in animal tests). 
 Vaccine development and clinical trials include determination of a manufacturing 
process, preparation of pilot vaccine lots, and clinical evaluation in small- and large-
scale human trials. 
 Manufacturing and licensure include manufacturing the vaccine for commercial use 
and licensure by national regulatory agencies. 
 
2.2 Overview of taxonomy 
 
To better understand the institutional settings in which successful vaccines have been 
developed, we created a simple taxonomy of licensed vaccines based on the roles that 
universities, public agencies, and private industry played in their development. We compiled 
a list of innovative vaccines since 1945 and gathered information on their development and 
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licensure.2 In particular, we identified the organizations primarily responsible for each stage 
of each vaccine’s development (vaccine design, clinical trials, manufacturing, and licensing) 
and classified these R&D actors by sector (public, private nonprofit, or private for profit) 
(see Annex 1). University labs were included with public sector agencies, in part because 
they are often funded from public sources, although this simplification is reexamined in the 
discussion below. Basic research was not included in this analysis, since it nearly always 
occurs in academic and government settings.  
 
Using this approach, we identified four basic “models” of vaccine development and 
classified the vaccines accordingly.3 The number of innovative vaccines licensed since 1945 
in each category is shown in parentheses. 
 
1. Predominantly private sector development (6) 
2. Public-sector vaccine design, with handover to the private sector for trials and 
manufacturing (16) 
3. Predominantly public-sector development (9) 
4. Coordination by a nonprofit entity (1) 
 
This classification has several limitations. First, it covers only vaccines that were eventually 
licensed, leaving out the presumably large number of vaccine projects that failed at some 
stage. Though including these projects might have allowed us to compare the success rates 
of the different R&D models, the very limited data on failed vaccines would not allow this 
type of analysis. Second, the time required for each phase of development was not 
considered (except anecdotally in the case studies) because of the lack of comprehensive 
data and the difficulty of comparing across vaccines. Third, assigning primary responsibility 
for each stage of development inevitably involved some subjective choices, since vaccine 
R&D has often involved quite complex collaboration among multiple organizations. 
 
The classification focuses on the site of vaccine development and on the division of labor 
between the public and private sectors. It thus omits many other potentially important 
aspects of development, including sources of funding, the nature of cooperation between 
sectors, and the oversight or integration of the development process as a whole. Perhaps 
most importantly, our taxonomy does not address the organization of the R&D effort 
within the institutions that carried out each stage of development. These details are difficult 
to obtain in most cases, but they are more fully explored in the case studies that follow. 
 
                                            
2 The term “innovative vaccines” includes first vaccines for diseases with no previous vaccine 
available at the time of licensure, plus second-generation vaccines using a distinct strategy for vaccine 
design. For instance, both pneumococcal polysaccharide and pneumococcal conjugate vaccines are 
included. Vaccines before 1945 were excluded because data on early examples are very limited and 
because the very different regulatory and commercial settings in which these early vaccines were 
developed mean that they may not necessarily provide useful analogues to the present. 
 
3 In some cases where a stage occurred in more than one sector, the vaccines were classified in terms 
of the lead participant for that stage—typically the one that was overseeing the effort (and often the 
funder). 
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2.3 Models and case studies 
 
Predominantly private sector development: Hepatitis B  
 
Merck’s Heptavax-B vaccine against the hepatitis B virus (HBV), licensed in 1981, was 
largely developed in-house at Merck under the direction of Maurice Hilleman, head of the 
company’s virus and cell biology research. The disease’s serious public health impact and 
rising incidence made it a commercially attractive target for a preventive vaccine (Galambos 
and Sewell 1995).  
 
In 1965, academic researcher Baruch S. Blumberg identified a surface antigen of HBV that 
appeared in the blood of all human carriers; the discovery led to the development of a 
relatively simple blood test for the disease. In addition, Blumberg observed the development 
of antibodies to this antigen (Hilleman 1999). New York University physician Saul 
Krugman, who had been studying hepatitis in human subjects throughout the 1960s with 
Army sponsorship, had injected subjects with a solution of boiled HBV carrier blood and 
found that the mixture could stimulate specific antibodies to HBV. He challenged these 
subjects with the virus and found that they were protected. 
  
The Merck team embarked on HBV vaccine research in 1968. HBV could not be grown in 
cell culture, so the researchers had to depart from the strategy they had previously used to 
develop vaccines for polio, measles, mumps, and rubella. The work of Blumberg and 
Krugman convinced Hilleman that the surface antigen HBsAg could be the basis for an 
effective vaccine and that carrier plasma contained enough antigen to make a vaccine 
(Galambos and Sewell 1995). Thus the Merck laboratory set about developing a process to 
purify and inactivate the antigen from plasma (Hilleman 1999). Previous work at NIAID 
provided critical information on centrifugation procedures; NIAID researchers also 
conducted some initial primate studies, results of which were shared with Merck researchers 
at a number of open scientific meetings. Following these and promising studies in 
chimpanzees, the first human trials were carried out on a group of senior-level Merck 
employees (on the rationale that they would have the lowest chance of natural exposure) in 
1975 (Hilleman 2000; National Vaccine Advisory Committee 1999).  
 
As the research team worked out a dosing regimen, plans were laid for a more extensive 
clinical trial at the New York Blood Center. This two-year Merck-funded trial, which 
started in 1978, showed virtually perfect protection against HBV. A study organized by the 
NIAID (with help from the hepatitis unit of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
[CDC]) gave a similar result, and the vaccine was licensed in November 1981 (Galambos 
and Sewell 1995). 
 
Following licensure, Hilleman’s team continued to refine the manufacturing process. From 
start to finish, the vaccine took 65 weeks to manufacture and required large amounts of 
HBV carrier blood. By mid-1982, Merck had tripled antigen recovery and managed to 
supply enough vaccine for all recommended high-risk groups in the U.S. (Galambos and 
Sewell 1995). 
 
Still, at more than US$100 total for the three doses, Heptavax-B was unusually costly, and 
it was unlikely that there would be enough carrier plasma available to accomplish the more 
15 
ambitious public health goal of vaccinating the entire U.S. population. In addition, the 
response to these issues, Merck ramped up its work on using recombinant DNA techniques 
to express the HBsAg antigen. In this case, rather than developing the vaccine in-house, 
Merck collaborated with the universities of California and Washington, using recombinant 
technology from the small European company BioGen to develop an adequate expression 
platform. The vaccine resulting from this partnership, Recombivax-HB, was licensed in 
1986 and was the world’s first vaccine based on recombinant technology. 
 
Although the foundation for the hepatitis vaccine was laid by academic research, and 
NIAID played a role in clinical testing and made contributions to vaccine design, Merck was 
primarily responsible for practical development of the candidate, clinical trials, 
manufacturing, and licensure. This vaccine thus serves as an example of vaccine 
development in the private sector. 
 
Handover to the private sector for trials and manufacturing (1): Lyme disease 
 
The first vaccine against Lyme disease was created largely in an academic setting and then 
licensed to the private sector, which organized and supported the later stages of 
development.  
 
Scientists at Yale University discovered the tick-borne bacteria that cause Lyme disease in 
1975, and the university continued to conduct substantial research into the condition over 
the next decades. In 1985, NIAID initiated a large extramural grant program focused on 
Lyme disease (NIAID 2002), which resulted in several important discoveries, including 
studies in hamsters indicating that ready-made antibodies could confer immunity passively 
(Johnson et al. 1986). Two American companies had developed inactivated whole-cell 
vaccines for use in dogs in the late 1980s, indicating the possibility of a human vaccine 
(Thanassi and Schoen 2000). 
 
The Yale team decided to focus on identifying recombinant proteins for use in a vaccine. 
The researchers cultured the bacteria and identified a key protein, Outer Surface Protein A 
(OspA), that was virtually identical in every strain of Lyme bacteria. After developing a 
mouse model for the disease, the team reported that mice could be protected by 
immunization with recombinant OspA expressed in E. coli.  
 
The success of the mouse model convinced the pharmaceutical company SmithKline 
Beecham (SKB) to license the vaccine candidate from Yale. They recognized a market based 
on the considerable public concern over Lyme disease and the well-documented increase in 
its incidence and geographic reach over the 1980s and early 1990s (Thanassi and Schoen 
2000). The company organized and sponsored a large Phase III trial in collaboration with 
the Yale research team. The SKB trial involved 31 trial sites around the New York 
metropolitan area and nearly 11,000 participants. The results showed the vaccine to be 
78% effective against Lyme disease and 100% effective against asymptomatic infection after 
three doses. The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licensed SKB’s 
LYMERix in December 1998. It was the first vaccine against Lyme disease and the first to 
use recombinant technology to express bacterial proteins that then generated immunity.  
 
emergent AIDS pandemic cast doubt on the safety of all plasma-derived products. In 
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SKB (later GlaxoSmithKline, or GSK) marketed LYMERix to high-risk groups over the next 
several years, but the vaccine did not sell as well as had been expected. Widely publicized 
safety concerns linking the vaccine to joint pain and other autoimmune side effects almost 
certainly contributed to these disappointing sales, although no connection between the 
vaccine and these adverse effects was ever definitively established. In February 2002, GSK 
pulled LYMERix from the market, citing inadequate sales (NIAID 2002). 
 
It is worth noting that Pasteur Mérieux Connaught also developed a Lyme disease vaccine 
based on recombinant OspA. Although this candidate performed well in Phase III trials, it 
was never licensed, probably because the market was not seen as sufficiently attractive. 
Since the Pasteur vaccine was apparently developed entirely in-house, this example 
illustrates the potential shortcomings of basing the taxonomy only on licensed vaccines. 
 
Handover to the private sector for trials and manufacturing (2): HPV 
 
As with the Lyme disease vaccine, much of the design work that led to HPV vaccines 
occurred in academic settings. Given the large investments needed to bring a candidate 
through to production and the high risk of the project, university groups actively sought 
industry’s involvement in the late design and clinical stages. Merck’s vaccine, Gardasil, was 
approved in June 2006, making it the first to market. Its development was paralleled by that 
of GSK’s Cervarix vaccine, which is expected to receive licensure in 2007.  
 
The prospects for an HPV vaccine were unclear at the outset. Virtually all previous vaccines 
had been directed at systemic disease, in which the pathogen passes through the 
bloodstream where it is particularly vulnerable to antibody responses, whereas HPV causes 
a local infection of the cervix. In addition, the familiar strategies of using attenuated or 
killed virus were not feasible for HPV because of concern about oncogenes carried by the 
cancer-causing strains. A subunit vaccine seemed to be the only possibility, and no subunit 
vaccine had ever been tested against local infection (Lowy and Schiller 2006). 
 
As a result, early progress toward a vaccine resulted from fortuitous discoveries at academic 
laboratories that had not initially set out to design a vaccine. Researchers at the National 
Cancer Institute (NCI), the University of Rochester, Georgetown University, and the 
University of Queensland in Australia independently found that recombinantly expressed 
copies of L1, one of the proteins that make up HPV’s viral capsid, would automatically 
assemble into a particle that mimicked the structure of the full virus. Researchers then 
realized that these VLPs could potentially elicit protective antibodies to the virus (Inglis et 
al. 2006).  
 
The timing of the discovery and design of VLPs among these institutions is unclear, and a 
lengthy and complex patent dispute was not resolved until more than a decade after the 
original applications. Although the Queensland group reported VLPs first, the Georgetown 
group was eventually awarded the dominant patent for demonstrating that self-assembled 
L1 was recognized by a specific class of neutralizing antibodies (C. McNeil 2006). While 
patent rights were still in dispute, the U.S. Patent Office allowed Merck, GSK, and 
MedImmune (the companies that ultimately took on HPV vaccine projects using VLP 
technology) uninterrupted access to the relevant inventions so that their research could 
move forward. Eventually the companies signed royalty agreements with all four institutions 
(Inglis et al. 2006; D.G. McNeil 2006).  
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In Australia, the biotech company CSL, Ltd., licensed the VLP technology from the 
University of Queensland and sponsored their work for several years, with ambitions to 
develop a marketable vaccine. They eventually licensed their technology to Merck based on 
the perceived need for very large resource inputs. MedImmune, on the other hand, took on 
the initial stages of preparing for clinical trials itself, partnering with GSK after early-stage 
trials (Inglis et al. 2006). With no animal model for HPV, both companies sought to initiate 
human trials as quickly as possible. 
 
Although the university groups had developed the key concepts that led to the HPV vaccine, 
some aspects of vaccine design, notably the expression system, the adjuvant, and the 
vaccination strategy, became the responsibility of the companies (Lowy and Schiller 2006). 
Substantial effort was thus required to develop reliable, consistent production processes 
before initiating trials. Both Merck and GSK eventually conducted Phase IIb “test-of-
principle” trials of their candidates, with HPV infection as an endpoint, before moving on 
to Phase III trials in more than 60,000 participants worldwide, which examined the 
vaccines’ efficacy in preventing cervical dysplasia. Both vaccines were shown to be highly 
efficacious at preventing the strains of HPV to which they are targeted, and the total value 
of the HPV vaccine market has been estimated at US$4 to 7 billion per year by 2010 (GSK 
2005). 
 
Predominantly public sector development: Influenza 
 
The first whole killed virus vaccine, against influenza, was developed almost entirely within 
the public sector by the U.S. Army during World War II. The influenza virus had been 
isolated at the National Institute for Medical Research in London. In the early 1940s, an 
academic researcher in Australia developed a method for growing the influenza virus in 
embryonated chicken eggs, putting vaccine development and production within reach. 
 
The U.S. military had a strong interest in developing a vaccine against influenza after the 
massive loss of American soldiers to the disease in the 1918-19 pandemic; some estimate 
that up to 80% of U.S. World War I casualties were caused by influenza (Department of 
Defense 1998). In 1941, the Surgeon General’s Office set up the Board for Investigation and 
Control of Influenza and other Epidemic Diseases in the U.S. Army in 1941, which later 
became the Armed Forces Epidemiology Board (AFEB). This Board set up a Commission on 
Influenza to contract civilian scientists to work on influenza.  
 
The Commission’s director, Thomas Francis, led a laboratory at the University of Michigan 
working to design a vaccine candidate using this cultured virus, which they grew in eggs and 
then inactivated with a formaldehyde solution. Meanwhile, the Commission set up contracts 
with several academic bodies for work to improve virus yields, titration accuracy, and 
purification procedures (Hoyt 2006; NIAID 2002).  
 
Once the vaccine had been refined by Francis’s team, the Commission issued contracts to a 
number of American pharmaceutical companies to produce sample lots; Francis then tested 
the lots for purity and consistency in his laboratory and provided feedback and advice 
(Hoyt 2006). Meanwhile, the Surgeon General’s Office authorized a large-scale trial of the 
vaccine within training units of the Army, and the AFEB immunized 12,500 Army troops 
with Francis’s vaccine in October and November 1943. Testing in troops considerably 
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simplified the clinical trial process, because troops acted as a stable population with high 
compliance, and uniform observation and follow-up were relatively straightforward and 
simple for the researchers (Hoyt 2006).  
 
The trial indicated that the vaccine was 70 to 90% effective in preventing influenza type A, 
and licenses were very rapidly granted to the companies with which Francis had been 
collaborating for manufacturing. These companies were able to expand to civilian markets 
by early 1946 (NIAID 2002). 
 
The military continued to serve an important role in improving influenza vaccines after the 
vaccines showed disappointingly little effect during the flu season of 1947. Researchers at 
the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) confirmed that circulating influenza 
viruses change over time, and they developed tests to quantify differences among viruses 
from different years. This led directly to the development of reliable procedures for 
producing effective killed-virus immunizations against influenza year by year (Hilleman 
1999).  
 
Although the U.S. Army funded and directed all stages of the effort to develop an influenza 
vaccine, it carried out only the clinical trials. Applied research and vaccine design were 
contracted to academic labs, while vaccine production was first contracted and then licensed 
to private firms.  
 
Coordination by a nonprofit entity: Polio 
 
The first polio vaccine provides an example of vaccine development coordinated by a 
nonprofit actor, the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (NFIP, also known as the 
March of Dimes). To date it is the only licensed vaccine developed under this model, 
although the influenza case also featured a dominant entity that coordinated work carried 
out by others. 
 
In the 1930s, as the number of poliomyelitis cases steadily rose in the U.S., little was known 
about the virus that caused the disease, and it could not be grown in the laboratory. 
Working with virus extracted from infected monkeys, researchers tested crude attenuated 
vaccines on 10,000 children, resulting in six deaths and widespread negative publicity 
(Baker 2000). 
 
The NFIP, a private charity started by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1938, was a 
key agitator for polio vaccine development throughout the late 1930s and 1940s. Its funds 
supported a wide variety of polio-related research (Baker and Katz 2004). In the late 1940s, 
the Foundation decided to move away from funding open-ended research and to focus on 
work that would lead directly to a vaccine (Cohen 2001). This move was prompted by a 
critical 1949 breakthrough, when a team led by John Enders at the Children’s Hospital of 
Boston propagated the virus in non-nervous tissue, giving researchers a straightforward 
means of culturing the virus for use in vaccine development (Baker 2000; Blume 2005).  
 
Jonas Salk, a researcher who had worked at Thomas Francis’s laboratory developing the 
killed influenza vaccine, established a laboratory at the University of Pittsburgh in 1947 to 
work on identifying different types of poliovirus under an NFIP grant (Pearce 2004). 
Having identified three types by the end of 1948, Salk set out to develop a killed virus 
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vaccine. His team developed a procedure for growing the virus in monkey renal cell cultures 
and inactivating it with formaldehyde, and successful results from animal studies 
encouraged them to go forward into human tests. 
 
The first human trials of Salk’s vaccine, aimed at assessing antibody responses, were 
conducted at the D.T. Watson Home for Crippled Children on children who had previously 
suffered from polio. The study was kept secret, with the exception of Salk’s laboratory staff, 
key D.T. Watson staff, and a few senior individuals at NFIP, which provided funding. The 
next test was conducted on institutionalized children at the Polk State School who had no 
history of polio; it would likely have been highly controversial had it been publicized (Baker 
and Katz 2004; Cohen 2001). These trials indicated that the vaccine could be effective, and 
Salk and NFIP officials set out to initiate a very large field trial as quickly as possible. 
Despite considerable criticism from senior virologists (including Enders and Alfred Sabin), 
Salk and NFIP director Basil O’Connor were so convinced that the vaccine would succeed 
that they at first refused to allow for placebo controls in the field trial (Baker 2000). After 
vocal concerns from several state officials who were wary of the trial’s NFIP sponsorship, 
O’Connor appointed Thomas Francis to conduct an independent evaluation of the trial’s 
design (Baker 2000; IAVI 2006).  
 
The trial was initiated in 1954 in 1.8 million children at 211 test sites across the country, 
using a combination of placebo controls and “observed controls” (Meldrum 1998). 
O’Connor contacted six companies early in the trial to begin to produce the vaccine so that 
warehoused stock would be available for launching an immunization campaign as soon as 
the trial results were in (Baker 2000). At a highly anticipated press conference in April 
1955, Francis announced that the trial had shown the vaccine to be over 90% effective 
against virus types 2 and 3 and 60 to 70% effective against type 1 (Blume 2005). Within 
hours, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had licensed six 
companies to produce the vaccine (Baker 2000). Salk himself famously refused to patent or 
profit from his vaccine (Pearce 2004; Robbins 2003). 
 
2.4 Discussion 
 
This historical review reveals considerable diversity in the organization of vaccine R&D 
since 1945. When the entire period is considered, no particular model dominates (see Table 
2). Among the vaccines that we considered, six were developed primarily by private industry 
(model 1), while nine were taken to at least the production stage by universities or the 
public sector (model 3). In a further 16 cases, the candidate vaccines were developed in 
academic or public labs and then handed to the private sector for large-scale trials and 
manufacture (model 2). (We did not identify examples in which a candidate was transferred 
from the private to the public or nonprofit sector.4 Moreover, no model (or sector) is more 
strongly associated with innovation, since the eight vaccines that were the first examples of 
a new type are also well distributed across the three models (see Table 2).5  
 
                                            
4 Several drugs have followed this path recently, as PDPs or other nonprofit entities resume 
development of promising candidates abandoned by the private sector.  
 
5 In extracting lessons for HIV vaccines, one would perhaps prefer to focus on the “hardest” 
vaccines, those whose development required overcoming the greatest scientific or technological 
hurdles. But there is no straightforward way to objectively rank difficulty. 
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Our fourth model—direction by a nonprofit entity—applies only to the Salk polio vaccine. 
But this case highlights an important nuance in analyzing the organization of R&D: the 
distinction between carrying out the work and managing the process. Although the NFIP 
did not develop candidates or conduct trials itself, it managed the entire process of vaccine 
development, overseeing university and private sector partners. Similarly, the U.S. Army 
directed the development of the influenza vaccine, although many steps in the process were 
contracted to academic labs or pharmaceutical firms. This model is likely to become more 
common as firms specialize in particular stages of the product cycle and as PDPs and other 
integrating agents become more important. Thus overall management, including decisions 
on research priorities and choices among candidates, could be considered a separate task or 
role in vaccine development, distinct from the conventionally defined stages of the process. 
This role is central to the issues discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Table 2. List of vaccines, by model  
Note: Bold entries are first examples of different types (see Table 1, page 12) 
Model Vaccines 
1. Predominantly private sector development Cholera, inactivated (1952) 
Mumps, live (1967) 
Hepatitis B, plasma-derived (1981) 
Hepatitis B, recombinant (1986) 
Typhoid Vi polysaccharide (1992) 
Pneumo conjugate, 7-valent (2000) 
2. Public-sector vaccine design, with 
handover to the private sector for trials and 
manufacturing 
Measles, live (1963) 
Rubella (1967) 
Pneumo polysaccharide (1977) 
Typhoid, live oral (1981) 
Hib polysaccharide (1985) 
Hib conjugate (1988) 
DTaP (1991) 
Hepatitis A (1991) 
Cholera, live oral (1994) 
Varicella (1995) 
Lyme disease (1998) 
Rotavirus (1998) 
Influenza, live attenuated intranasal (2003) 
HPV (2006) 
Rotavirus, live oral pentavalent (2006) 
Zoster (2006) 
3. Predominantly public-sector development Influenza (1945) 
Polio, oral trivalent (1963) 
Mumps, inactivated (1948) 
Adenovirus (1957) 
Anthrax (1970) 
Meningococcal polysaccharide (1974-5) 
Adenovirus, live oral (1980) 
Meningococcal (types B and C) (1989) 
Japanese encephalitis B, killed (1992) 
4. Coordination by a nonprofit entity Inactivated polio (1955) 
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A simple enumeration of vaccines produced by various institutional models sheds little light 
on the relative efficiency of vaccine development in these settings. As discussed earlier, it 
would be useful to compare the success rates of the different models, that is, the fraction of 
adequately funded initiatives that led to a useful vaccine or the fraction of promising leads 
that were taken all the way to a licensed product. But success rates of this kind would be 
extremely difficult to define or measure, because there is much less information on failed 
vaccine development projects than successful ones and because it would be hard to define an 
“adequately funded initiative” or a “promising lead.” Moreover, it would be risky to draw 
conclusions from a direct comparison of success rates for the different models, since the 
models adopted for particular challenges are almost certainly influenced by the nature of the 
challenge; that is, industry may shy away from “harder” vaccines, leaving the public sector 
with a lower rate of success. Thus we cannot say whether a particular R&D model has in 
the past been more or less likely to produce a vaccine. Similarly, we have not compared the 
speed or cost of vaccine R&D in the various models (and thus in the public or private 
sector), although in theory this might be possible, at least for the later phases of vaccine 
development.6  
 
The lack of information on paths not taken or candidates abandoned before licensure also 
makes it difficult to analyze the relative performance of different types of organizations in 
managing the overall process of vaccine 
development. It has been asserted that portfolio 
management is a particular strength of big 
pharma, attributable to long experience and the 
discipline of the market.7 While these arguments 
are plausible, they also suggest that public or 
nonprofit institutions could strengthen these 
capacities by hiring managers with private sector experience and by creating internal 
incentives that mimic those that prevail within successful firms. 
 
Looking at our data by development stage, we 
find that basic research has in most cases been 
conducted at universities or research institutes, 
often with public funding. Industry does conduct 
basic research and could presumably do more. 
But basic research is generally considered a 
public good—with benefits far greater than can 
be captured by the researcher—and the role of 
governments in supporting it is broadly 
accepted.  
 
                                            
6 In particular, it might be possible to compare the average time it has taken industry and the 
public/nonprofit sector to move a vaccine candidate through clinical trials. Such a comparison would 
only be possible for the relatively small number of vaccines developed after the current system of trial 
regulation was well established, and would be subject to some of the same objections as is the much 
more difficult analysis of “success rates.”  
 
7 We note that the perhaps the most criticized decision in the history of HIV vaccines, to undertake 
Phase III trials of VaxGen’s gp120 protein subunit candidate, was made in the private sector, 
although not by an established vaccine firm.
“The government functions less efficiently 
than corporations at achieving scale-up and 
commercialization. I think only the private 
sector knows how to deal with regulatory 
agencies, take a product to market, and do 
manufacturing and distribution.” 
 
“Many skills are exclusively ‘owned’ by 
industry.”  
“[Nonprofits are] unable to stop a project – 
in industry you have to be able to make 
these decisions. This is the disciplining 
power of money, which a lot of other 
incentives don’t have.”  
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At the other end of the pipeline, almost all the vaccines that we list were at least initially 
manufactured by industry. The public sector is certainly capable of producing vaccines: 
several European countries made vaccines until relatively recently, and the states of 
Massachusetts and Michigan once had production facilities. The Soviet bloc, of course, 
made its own vaccines in the public sector, and a number of countries in the developing 
world, including China, Cuba, and Brazil, do so today, accounting for a large proportion of 
vaccines used globally. But in the U.S., and increasingly in Europe, vaccine production has 
been largely ceded to the private pharmaceutical industry (Blume 2005). Since vaccine 
development has typically begun with research in the public sector and ended with 
manufacture by industry, the three common models that we have defined are distinguished 
by the sectors responsible for vaccine design, development, and large-scale clinical trials. 
 
Changes in the vaccine industry in recent decades 
 
So far we have considered vaccine history since 1945 as a whole. As our review showed, a 
number of institutional models of vaccine development flourished in this period, and both 
the public and private sectors repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to develop vaccine 
candidates and to bring them through clinical trials. Dividing the record into earlier and 
later periods, however, reveals that patterns of vaccine R&D have become less diverse in 
recent decades. In particular, large-scale clinical trials have become the nearly exclusive 
province of industry. Of the 20 vaccines on our list that were licensed since 1980, 18 were 
carried through trials at least partially by industry. The only exception was the 
meningococcus B and C vaccine, developed by a public-sector institution in Cuba, and the 
Japanese encephalitis B vaccine developed in Japan on the basis of work done earlier by the 
U.S. Army. Applied research and candidate development continue to take place primarily 
but not exclusively in the public sector, with academia in particular making substantially 
more contributions than during the period before 1980; we see no obvious change in 
industry’s contribution to these stages.  
 
The withdrawal of the public sector from 
later stages of vaccine development is 
explained in part by the diminishing role 
of the U.S. military (represented by 
WRAIR), although a similar trend can be 
seen outside the U.S. as well. Many factors 
probably contributed to this shift, 
including competition with the private sector for funding and researchers and (in the U.S.) 
with the NIH, and perhaps also a political climate unfavorable to public-sector approaches 
to social problems. But it seems likely that the dramatic decline in the burden of infectious 
disease in the developed world (at least until the advent of AIDS) played an important role 
by reducing public pressure for new vaccines.8  
 
By shifting public attention from the benefits of vaccines to their risks, declining fear of 
infectious disease has probably contributed to another important trend in the vaccine 
industry: higher development costs associated with more stringent regulatory oversight. We 
                                            
8 Wyeth-Lederle’s withdrawal of its rotavirus vaccine RotaShield soon after it was licensed in 1999, 
after it was associated with a small number of cases of intussusception in infants, is a particularly 
dramatic example of this trend. 
“The Army used to play an extremely important 
role and attracted high-quality people. But its 
potential has been taken away by a loss of 
funding, and competition with the NIH has 
created redundancies and basically demoralized 
the Army researchers.”  
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note in particular the introduction of rules of good manufacturing practice (GMP) in 1980, 
which have raised the cost of a manufacturing plant for vaccines to as high as US$200 
million (Douglas 2003). Moreover, 
candidate vaccines now tested in humans 
must often be produced in the same way 
and to the same standard as marketed 
products (Baylor and Midthun 2003). 
Standards for licensure have arguably 
become more stringent as well; it is likely 
that some vaccines licensed in the past 
would not now be approved. Meanwhile, 
ethical standards for trials have also been 
refined and more consistently implemented 
in recent decades. These changes, put in 
place to protect trial participants and 
patients, increase the cost and complexity of R&D and mean that companies face huge 
financial setbacks if products fail. This risk, in turn, means that in general products must 
promise very high revenues and high probabilities of success for firms to find them worth 
developing. Moreover, it has become difficult for all but the largest, most experienced firms 
to manage the cost, risk, and regulatory complexity of vaccine development. 
 
Regulatory and scientific risk, along with concerns about litigation—despite a no-fault 
award system for vaccines in the U.S.—have made vaccines less attractive to industry.9 Slow 
demand is also a factor: vaccines make up less than 2% of the global pharmaceutical market 
and, at least until recently, sales were growing by just 1% per year (Center for Global 
Development Advance Market Commitment Working Group 2005; IOM 2004).10 Most of 
the burden of infectious disease—including diseases for which no vaccine yet exists—is now 
borne by developing countries with little ability to pay for even life-saving new products, 
particularly because new, more complicated vaccines come at a high price. As a result, in the 
previous three decades the number of firms supplying vaccines to the U.S. market has 
dropped from more than 30 to five, with a similar decline occurring in Europe (Rappuoli et 
al. 2002). Although some of this trend reflects a broader consolidation in big pharma, there 
is little doubt that the industry as a whole has shifted investment away from vaccines. There 
is reason to hope, however, that vaccines are becoming attractive again to industry: boosted 
by expected blockbuster sales of new vaccines like HPV, the market is projected to grow at 
double-digit rates in coming years (Sheridan 2005).  
 
An important consequence of these underlying trends has been to leave the skills and 
experience necessary for several essential steps in vaccine R&D—notably development of 
manufacturing processes and conduct of trials capable of supporting licensure—almost 
exclusively in the hands of a small number of large firms. As a result, most vaccines have 
followed a similar path from basic science to market in recent years. Promising approaches 
or vaccine candidates developed in universities or public labs have been passed on to a small 
set of big firms, which then carry them through large-scale clinical trials, manufacturing, 
and licensure.  
                                            
9 One study found the market entrance probability of a vaccine candidate at the preclinical stage to 
be just over half that for all pharmaceutical products (Struck 1996). 
10 This excludes sales related to the global polio eradication campaign. 
“Once you could initiate clinical research with 
materials that weren’t perfectly pristine … but 
now, clinical trials for safety have become so vast 
that most candidates cannot even get to this 
stage.” 
 
“Now there are huge costs just to get to Phase I. 
Companies won’t take anything into trials until a 
GMP process is already done.” 
 
“Maybe a lower-efficacy vaccine would be useful, 
but you can’t give the FDA 30 or 40%. Advanced 
countries are very stuffy and risk-averse.” 
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This simple picture of early-stage development in the public sector followed by later stages 
in big pharma is complicated somewhat by the public sector’s renewed capacity for carrying 
out large trials, at least in the case of HIV vaccines (see next section), and by the growing 
role of biotech. The public sector is preparing to carry out large efficacy trials of HIV 
vaccines, although it has not yet demonstrated that it can conduct licensure trials in today’s 
demanding regulatory context. Moreover, while biotechnology companies, often working in 
close collaboration with academic labs, now do much of the early-stage research that lies 
behind products marketed by large pharmaceutical companies, relatively few—only about 
40 of the thousands of companies worldwide—work on vaccines (Sheridan 2005). Several 
recently licensed vaccines passed through a smaller firm before being picked up by an 
experienced vaccine manufacturer, and it is commonly supposed that big pharma will rely 
increasingly on the biotech industry for candidate vaccines. But overall, the contribution of 
biotech to the vaccines on our list is small. So far, it appears that fundamental innovation 
continues to take place primarily at universities (although the intimate relationship between 
university labs and biotech companies blurs the boundaries between the private and public 
sectors), and the primary contribution of biotech is likely to be to applied research and 
candidate design.  
Box 2. The changing role of intellectual property 
 
The increasing cost and complexity of pharmaceutical R&D in the past few decades has been 
accompanied by a trend toward more comprehensive intellectual property (IP) protection. 
Patents have increasingly been granted to technologies and platforms as well as to 
commercially marketed products. This trend, along with a 1984 U.S. law allowing 
universities to patent discoveries arising from publicly funded research, has led universities to 
focus more on building patent portfolios and encouraged individual researchers to create 
spin-off biotech companies (Mahoney et al. 2003). 
 
Some critics are skeptical that the ability to patent early-stage research advances is useful, 
arguing that it causes publicly supported institutions to focus too much on potential profit 
and neglect areas with less obvious payoff. Meanwhile, some researchers have suggested that 
the IP landscape is so complex, with webs of IP protection extending over virtually all 
technologies and platforms involved in all R&D stages, that innovation may be stifled. The 
HPV vaccine example, however, suggests that complex and contentious IP situations can be 
managed to allow product development to move forward. 
 
The creation of the World Trade Organization, and in particular the Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, has led to greater enforcement of IP 
provisions for pharmaceuticals worldwide. Although these changes will probably have their 
most immediate impact on generic production of existing drugs and vaccines, they can be 
expected to affect pharmaceutical R&D as well. While the increased protection could 
discourage research, greater certainty of patent protection might make vaccines for 
developing-country markets more attractive.  
 
There has also been concern that the increased strength of global IP protection could block 
access in poor countries to new vaccines once they are developed (Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 2006). Although this is a very real concern, IP 
arrangements that ensure access for the developing world have been developed since the mid-
1990s. IAVI’s licensing agreements with private sector partners, which protect companies’ IP 
rights in the developed world but require affordable access for poor countries, are just one 
example. 
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This overview of public and private sector contributions obscures a striking feature of the 
history of vaccine development, especially during the middle decades of the last century: the 
dominant roles of WRAIR and Merck. For several decades these very different institutions 
remained centers of excellence in vaccine 
development and between them accounted 
for a large share of new vaccines. Although 
its goals were not completely aligned with 
those of general public health, the Army’s 
focus on rapid product development, as 
well as its access to large pools of potential 
trial subjects, helped WRAIR become an important center of vaccine development and 
clinical testing. Of the 14 vaccines in which the public sector had a role in conducting trials, 
eight involved the Army. For its part, Merck contributed to 10 of the 20 vaccines in which 
the private sector had a role in the applied research/candidate design phase. The cases of 
Merck and the Army illustrate the importance of specific organizations, and perhaps special 
leadership, in creating the conditions for sustained productivity.  
 
Box 3. Product development public-private partnerships (PDPs): 
a growing role in vaccine R&D 
 
In the past ten years, a notable share of public and philanthropic support for R&D on 
neglected global diseases has gone to PDPs. These institutions unite public-sector 
commitment to public goods with private sector expertise and methods to promote R&D 
through systematic candidate portfolios. PDPs also advocate for new funding and 
commitment to R&D for diseases in the developing world. 
 
PDPs can serve as a major stimulus to R&D throughout the process, combining low capital 
costs and a commitment to global public goods with an industry-like R&D model, including 
strong incentive to bring products all the way through to market. These efforts are already 
showing tangible results: by 2005, one analysis found that more than 60 projects for new 
therapeutic drugs for neglected diseases were under way, with over two-thirds undertaken by 
PDPs in partnership with the private sector. This is in stark contrast to the period before the 
advent of PDPs: between 1975 and 1997, just 13 new drugs were developed specifically for 
neglected diseases (Moran et al. 2005). 
 
In addition, by pioneering new ways of working and raising the profile of diseases of the 
developing world, the PDPs are helping to drive change in both the public and private sectors. 
Governments are contributing more funds for R&D for neglected diseases, and industry is 
also becoming more active. Over the past five years, four of the 12 largest multinational 
pharmaceutical companies have established infectious disease divisions. 
 
IAVI, launched in 1996, has been at the forefront of the PDP movement and is the only PDP 
dedicated to finding an HIV vaccine. In its first ten years, IAVI has developed six new vaccine 
products, established major new clinical trial capacity in Africa and Asia, and mobilized 
nearly half a billion dollars in new funding. Through this work, IAVI has served as a model 
for numerous other PDPs leading efforts in other fields to find solutions to the world’s most 
pressing health challenges. 
“The Army played a very important role, with its 
history and infrastructure for development and 
long experience with clinical trials.” 
 
“Vaccine design has almost never [been done by] 
corporations, except for Hilleman and Merck.” 
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Since the unusual qualities of the Army and Merck cannot be attributed to all 
pharmaceutical firms or to all public sector research institutions, there are clearly risks in 
generalizing about the roles of the public and private sectors from 20th-century vaccine 
history.11 Important insights could be gained by focusing on the qualities that successful 
organizations share regardless of the sector to which they belong, although this is outside 
the scope of this paper. For example, the Army apparently shared with successful firms a 
disciplined focus on an ultimate product, while the Merck Corporation nurtured innovation 
by giving Maurice Hilleman’s laboratory unusual autonomy and the latitude to conduct 
early-stage research (Hilleman 1999).  
 
In summary, our historical review demonstrates that vaccines have been developed in a 
variety of institutional settings. In recent years, however, the withdrawal of the public sector 
from the later stages of vaccine development, coupled with the increasing concentration of 
certain critical capacities in a handful of large firms, have established the notion of a 
“standard” model of vaccine development in which promising candidates are developed by 
university labs and biotech firms (often working together and often with public funding) 
and then licensed to big pharma for clinical trials, licensing, and manufacture. This model 
has worked well in the past and makes good use of the relative strengths of the various 
classes of organizations as they stand today. The public (or private nonprofit) sector could 
rebuild the capacity to carry promising vaccine candidates through later stages of 
development in cases where industry is unable or unwilling to do so, but increased 
regulatory complexity makes these steps more challenging than in the past. 
 
Implications for HIV vaccine development 
 
Our review shows that the most common path of vaccine development begins with research 
and candidate design in university or public sector labs and finishes with industry taking 
vaccines to market. This historical pattern 
suggests that an HIV vaccine will 
eventually be produced by or with the 
active involvement of the private sector. 
The large pharmaceutical companies now 
clearly have the greatest expertise in 
process development, clinical trials, large-
scale manufacturing, and licensure, and it 
makes sense to take reasonable steps to make HIV vaccines as attractive to industry as 
possible and to prepare for a smooth and rapid hand-over. But the historical record also 
shows that other R&D models have also worked well, and recent developments have altered 
the landscape in important ways.12 
 
                                            
11 The great diversity of organizations within each “sector” is particularly apparent on the public 
side, which includes universities (many of them, of course, not public but private nonprofit), federal 
and state funding agencies like NIH, and public research institutions in the U.S. and elsewhere, 
including the WRAIR. Although it might be useful to further disaggregate these very different 
entities, doing so would require disentangling the links among them and distinguishing roles in 
funding, supervision, and overall priority-setting, and therefore is not addressed within the scope of 
this paper. 
12 National Science Foundation 
 
“Vaccine development has to be small scale and 
scattered widely, because you never know where 
the right idea is going to come from.” 
 
“You have to be willing to indulge creative ideas 
… NIH should support goal-driven kinds a bit 
less and encourage a more NSF-style12 research, 
with open-ended funding.” 
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For early stages of development, the universities remain the primary site of innovation, and 
maintaining a climate that supports new ideas will be essential to overcoming the basic 
scientific challenges to an HIV vaccine (see Section III). The public sector’s ability to 
contribute to the next steps in HIV vaccine development, applied research, and candidate 
design has been strengthened by the establishment of the NIH’s VRC. In the private sector, 
the biotechnology industry is likely to become more important for these stages, and it is 
critical to involve it further in HIV vaccine research.  
 
In contrast, the role of big pharma in candidate development is likely to shrink further 
(although Merck’s active program constitutes an important counter-example). This 
distinction is important, because the measures required to encourage the involvement of the 
two classes of firms may be quite different. While changing the calculations of the largest 
pharmaceutical firms might require altering the market prospects for a vaccine, biotech 
firms can be engaged through various kinds of grants and contracts, and perhaps by other 
innovative non-market incentives. The highest priority for early stages of HIV vaccine 
development should be continued vigorous funding of university research, along with 
finding new ways to further engage the biotech industry. Although greater involvement of 
big pharma in early stages of HIV vaccine development is surely desirable, it is not essential. 
 
In contrast to earlier stages of R&D, large clinical trials of recently licensed vaccines have 
been conducted almost exclusively by big pharma.  But the private sector generally assumes 
this burden only when candidates show sufficient promise of reaching market. It is far from 
clear that current HIV vaccine candidates meet this standard, yet there are compelling 
reasons to conduct at least some large 
trials, in part because some vital 
information can be obtained only in this 
way. While the big firms can probably 
conduct trials more efficiently, the public 
sector has successfully shepherded vaccines through trials in the past and can do so again if 
necessary. Moreover, industry has less experience with large trials in developing countries, 
and in the specific case of HIV vaccines, the HIV Vaccine Trials Network (HVTN) and 
IAVI, together with partners in developing countries, have given the public sector 
substantial new trial capacity.13 This capacity should be strengthened further. For HIV 
vaccines, it may not be necessary for the public sector to conduct actual licensing trials, 
since a promising vaccine would likely be picked up by industry before then (see below). But 
building the capacity to carry a vaccine all the way to licensure would be a useful insurance 
policy and might facilitate the development of other vitally needed vaccines (for example, 
for TB or malaria) that may never be commercially viable.  
 
There is little recent precedent for the manufacture of new vaccines by the public sector, and 
every effort should be make to engage industry in this stage of development when the time 
comes. This will probably not be difficult for a vaccine that does well in trials, however, 
since the potential market for an HIV vaccine is quite large, especially if it can be sold in 
wealthy countries. Industry’s involvement is currently limited primarily by scientific 
uncertainty; if this were overcome, and substantial costs had already been borne by the 
public sector, an HIV vaccine would become quite attractive. Additional incentives may be 
                                            
13 It is important to note that a significant portion of the public sector’s vaccine trial capacity is now 
focused on HIV vaccines. 
“Pharma is just not really designed for early-stage 
research and early trials – they’ll do it if they see 
a very high-revenue product at the end, but not 
for smaller projects.” 
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necessary to persuade firms to adapt and test a vaccine for the developing world. Moreover, 
if no partner is willing to take a vaccine forward on a purely commercial basis, it should be 
possible for a public or nonprofit entity developing a vaccine to contract out manufacture, 
possibly to a firm in the developing world. Thus the comparative advantage that industry 
now clearly enjoys in vaccine production should not be an obstacle to development of an 
HIV vaccine even if few firms show interest in early stages.  
 
In summary then, while it makes sense to explore ways to bring the private sector’s 
expertise and experience to HIV vaccine development wherever possible, the importance of 
the various segments of the industry differs considerably at different stages of vaccine 
development. The involvement of the big pharmaceutical companies will be most important 
at later stages, after a candidate vaccine has demonstrated promise in human trials. 
University labs remain the most likely sites of innovation, while the biotechnology industry 
may have much to contribute to applied research and candidate design. The public sector 
has carried out many large trials in the past and should continue to rebuild this capacity. It 
is worth remembering that many important vaccines were developed primarily in the public 
sector, even though they were intended for populations in wealthy countries. Since HIV 
vaccines—and vaccines for such diseases as malaria and tuberculosis, which are even less 
attractive to the private sector—are most needed in the developing world, it is vital to 
preserve and strengthen the public (or nonprofit) sector’s capacity to develop and test 
vaccine candidates. 
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III. The organization of R&D efforts: Lessons from beyond vaccines 
 
3.1 Defining the issues 
 
In the last chapter we focused on where vaccine development takes place, that is, on the 
roles that the public, private, and nonprofit sectors have historically played in the various 
stages of vaccine R&D. In this chapter we turn to how R&D is organized, especially when 
many organizations are involved. How are decisions made and enforced in the face of 
scientific or technological uncertainty? How can cooperation and collaboration be fostered 
without stifling creativity and healthy competition? In order to shed light on these issues, we 
will look beyond vaccines to large-scale R&D initiatives in other areas. 
 
Although vaccine development has almost always involved a degree of collaboration among 
organizations, in most cases the number of players has been relatively small, and one entity 
has generally had clear responsibility for each phase of development. In contrast, the effort 
to develop an HIV vaccine now involves a staggering number of organizations, including 
public and private sector funders, universities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
large and small commercial firms, PDPs like IAVI, and consortia and coordinating bodies of 
various kinds. This institutional complexity reflects the scale and scientific difficulty of the 
effort, its global nature, the growing role of private foundations (especially the Gates 
Foundation), the appearance of PDPs, and changes in the pharmaceutical industry, 
particularly the development of the biotechnology sector. In part the apparent simplicity of 
past vaccine development efforts is an illusion: by focusing on the organizations that 
contributed to the development of the vaccines that were ultimately licensed and used, we 
ignore those that worked on other candidates or approaches. In the case of HIV vaccines, of 
course, it is not yet possible to say which approach will succeed, and thus which 
organizations will play a role in developing a successful candidate. Nonetheless, it seems 
clear that the HIV vaccine field is more complex than any previous vaccine effort. 
 
The variety and number of entities working 
on HIV vaccines has led some to call for 
greater coordination and more centralized 
decision-making (Coordinating Committee 
of the Global HIV/AIDS Vaccine 
Enterprise 2005; IAVI 2006). These 
commentators argue that competitive pressures, misaligned incentives, and lack of 
communication have resulted in duplication of effort and waste of critical resources, 
particularly scarce trial capacity; lack of collaboration and barriers to comparison of 
research and trial results; and insufficient attention to areas of work crucial for the field but 
unlikely to yield immediate rewards to 
individual researchers or organizations. 
Moreover, they argue that research efforts 
are insufficiently focused on tasks essential 
to vaccine development, in large part 
because the academic system and 
traditional research funding mechanisms 
reward open-ended exploration rather than 
the disciplined pursuit of useful results. 
“At the development stages you need discipline or 
you’ll never develop anything. You need a hands-
on management approach, because otherwise 
different groups will take shortcuts that will cause 
problems and delays down the line.”  
“In science, there’s competition, lack of openness, 
and secrecy in publishing. People publish data at 
conferences and then leave it at that—they don’t 
care about following through on results.” 
 
“Almost all the promising work I see at my own 
research center just comes to a halt, because there 
is not enough energy or capacity in the system to 
drive it through.”
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The apparently unfocused nature of the search for an HIV vaccine—and the disappointing 
results so far—are sometimes contrasted with the focus and discipline, and the spectacular 
success, of major national commitments in the past, particularly the Manhattan Project, 
which developed the atom bomb during World War II, and the space program that put 
astronauts on the moon in 1969. In both cases, unambiguous national commitment to 
clearly defined goals, backed by enormous resources, led to success in a remarkably short 
time despite daunting technological obstacles. It is easy to understand why these inspiring 
examples are so often invoked by those frustrated by slow progress toward socially 
desirable goals, from developing renewable energy sources to ending poverty. 
 
In this chapter, we explore whether these initiatives offer useful lessons for the HIV vaccine 
quest. More specifically, we will ask whether the HIV vaccine field should seek to mimic—
to the extent possible in a very different institutional context—the highly centralized 
organization that characterized both the Manhattan Project and the space program, which 
we call “mission mode.” 
  
There is no single, widely used definition of mission-mode R&D, though it is generally used 
to describe focused, publicly funded R&D efforts to achieve a well-defined goal (Nichols 
1971). We define mission mode by four characteristics: 
 
1) Strong commitment and leadership, backed by sufficient resources: In the cases we 
consider, the commitment was made by the U.S. government, which then provided 
the resources, but it is possible to imagine a private commitment on a similar scale. 
“Sufficient resources” is of course difficult to define, but the funds made available 
to the Manhattan Project and the space program were enormous, almost unlimited 
in practical terms. 
2) A clear and politically compelling goal. 
3) Centralized leadership with control over resources: For an initiative to qualify as a 
“mission,” the controlling body, whatever its nature, must have the authority to 
decide on approaches, allocate tasks, impose discipline and collaboration, and 
enforce adherence to an overall plan. 
4) Tight focus on the ultimate goal and the tasks necessary to achieve it: In practice 
this has generally meant an emphasis on applied research and engineering rather 
than more basic research. 
 
We restrict our discussion to initiatives that had to overcome substantial scientific or 
technological challenges. Ambitious projects that rely primarily on well-established 
knowledge and technology could meet the four criteria, and might share important 
characteristics with R&D missions. But the central importance of innovation to the 
initiatives we consider (and to the search for an HIV vaccine) is an essential consideration in 
weighing the merits of mission mode. 
 
The first two characteristics are necessary but not sufficient for mission mode as we define 
it. Moreover, understanding why some social goals inspire greater political commitment and 
receive more resources than others is beyond the scope of this paper, which concerns the 
organization rather than the scale of the R&D effort. The goal of developing a safe and 
effective HIV vaccine seems clear (and important) enough to satisfy the second criterion. For 
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this reason we focus on the third and fourth features of mission mode, which distinguish it 
from other ways of organizing a large-scale R&D initiative. 
 
Both the Manhattan Project and the moon effort appear to meet the four criteria for 
missions. The public sector’s Human Genome Project also qualifies, although the presence 
of the competing private sector initiative adds some complexity. President Carter’s initiative 
to develop alternatives to imported oil might also be eligible, although it could be argued 
that the objectives were too diffuse and that political commitment was not sustained. We 
will argue here that the so-called “War on Cancer” of the 1970s and 80s qualifies in 
important respects, at least in its initial stages, and thus can serve as a useful example of a 
mission that failed to achieve its original aims, although we recognize that this 
characterization can be contested.  
 
What is the alternative to mission mode? We will contrast this highly centralized way of 
organizing a major R&D challenge to an approach characterized by dispersed decision-
making, competition as well as collaboration, the absence of a rigidly defined and enforced 
division of responsibilities, and the pursuit of a more diffuse set of intermediate objectives. 
Probably few would dispute that the current search for an HIV vaccine, as well as the war 
on cancer as it is fought today, fits this description. Moreover, one might make the case that 
most of the technological successes of recent years, including the invention of the personal 
computer and the explosive growth of the internet, were characterized by highly dispersed 
decision-making and competition, although these advances were not responses to clearly 
defined national objectives. 
 
This contrast between mission mode and a looser approach involves some of the same issues 
that are implicit in discussions of the “industrial” and “academic” models of R&D. The 
industrial model, like mission mode, is said to feature centralized decision-making, clear 
division of responsibility, and narrow focus. Academic research, in contrast, is thought to be 
driven by the relatively uncoordinated pursuit of a broader set of objectives by individual 
researchers, under the loose guidance of the NIH or other funding agencies. For our 
purposes, however, this description muddies the waters in three ways.  
 
First, it confuses the way R&D efforts are managed within and across organizations. The 
managerial challenges and options facing the NIH, or the HIV vaccine field as a whole, are 
clearly very different from those facing Merck, or for that matter the Army. Second, it 
explicitly assigns one model to the private sector and the other to the public or academic 
sector, though the organization of R&D by 
WRAIR (or at Los Alamos during the war) 
surely resembles the “industrial model” in 
important respects. Even some large 
academic labs are highly organized along 
the lines of an “industrial model.” 
Conversely, the pursuit of new technology 
by industries as a whole, composed of numerous competing firms, is highly decentralized 
and uncoordinated. Finally, the industrial/academic distinction contrasts modes of 
organization that are typically used at different stages of the R&D process and thus are not 
directly comparable. In fact, as illustrated by the case studies presented in the previous 
section, the development of many vaccines involves a transition from one R&D “model” to 
the other. Thus, while the idea of an industrial model may yield valuable insights into the 
“Investigator-driven versus large-scale—I think 
this is an artificial duality of model. The HPV 
vaccine was developed by investigator-driven 
work and then commercialized by Merck and 
GSK. It didn’t take a PDP to develop an HPV 
vaccine.” 
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characteristics that help individual organizations succeed at certain R&D stages, it is not 
very useful for analyzing the organization of the HIV vaccine field as a whole. 
 
With these definitions and general considerations in mind, we turn to brief descriptions of 
two examples of mission-mode R&D, the Manhattan Project and the War on Cancer. In the 
final part of this chapter, we will ask what lessons can be learned from these experiences for 
the organization of the quest for an HIV vaccine. Would the HIV vaccine field benefit, now 
or at a later stage, from the more centralized decision-making and tighter focus that define 
mission mode? If at some point a move toward mission mode would be likely to accelerate 
progress, how will we know when that moment has arrived? 
 
3.2 Examples of centralized R&D initiatives 
 
The Manhattan Project 
The Manhattan Project refers to the effort from 1942 and 1946 to develop the first nuclear 
weapons, directed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The main theoretical basis for an 
atomic weapon had already been established when the Manhattan Project began, and four 
independent research groups were already investigating methods of uranium enrichment.  
 
When Army engineer Leslie P. Groves took command of the military effort in mid-1942, he 
determined that decisions on bomb production had to be made by the end of the year, 
meaning that the four groups were under considerable pressure to prove their method the 
best before then. On November 12, 1942, the Military Policy Committee decided to shut 
down one of the four projects; the Committee called for projects on two other methods to 
proceed directly to full scale without a pilot plant stage and for work to continue on 
plutonium production (Gosling 1999).  
 
On December 28, President Roosevelt initiated the official Manhattan Project by 
authorizing US$500 million for plant construction. The intense secrecy with which the 
project proceeded helped Groves and other project leaders retain tight central control and 
facilitated rapid decision-making (Gosling 1999). That these decisions were made on the 
basis of very little data and without a pilot plant stage indicates Groves’s emphasis on 
moving technology to production as fast as possible, even at the expense of traditional 
evaluation steps. This resulted in some serious unforeseen problems with the uranium plants 
but was considered essential for ensuring that sufficient uranium would be available in time 
to influence the course of the war. 
 
In spring 1943, a centralized laboratory for all of the project’s theoretical and experimental 
work opened at Los Alamos, NM, under the direction of J. Robert Oppenheimer, and a 
wide range of academic physicists and engineers were very rapidly recruited to work at the 
site. Groves insisted that scientists working on the project focus all their effort on making 
the weapon and drop lines of research not directly relevant to this end. Four divisions were 
established, under Oppenheimer’s central operational control: theoretical physics, 
experimental physics, chemistry and metallurgy, and ordnance. The theoretical physics 
division worked to determine key properties of uranium and plutonium to ensure that the 
weapon would work correctly. 
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In July 1944, faced with problems at the uranium plants, Groves and Oppenheimer 
orchestrated a major reorganization of the Los Alamos laboratory, freezing further work on 
the uranium bomb and focusing virtually all the scientists’ effort on developing a plutonium 
implosion bomb, the engineering of which was much more difficult. As a result, the 
uranium bomb was never tested before its use at Hiroshima. The implosion method had 
proven successful by the summer of 1945 (at the Trinity test) and was used in the attack on 
Nagasaki.  
 
The Manhattan Project well illustrates the four characteristics of mission mode and can be 
considered the canonical example of this form of R&D organization. Two features of the 
project may lessen its value somewhat as a model for other R&D initiatives. First, the 
extreme urgency of the effort, imposed by the less desirable alternative of invading the 
Japanese mainland and the fear of a competing German nuclear project, distorted decision-
making in ways that in other circumstances might even have reduced the chances of success. 
Second, the significant resources available to the project allowed it to pursue several very 
expensive alternative development paths simultaneously, thus mitigating the tradeoffs that a 
disciplined, centralized approach typically entails (if you don’t have to choose, there’s no 
gain from being able to make tough choices). 
 
The War on Cancer 
 
In 1970, health activist Mary Lasker, whose medical lobby conceived of the War on Cancer, 
arranged for a Senate resolution creating the National Panel of Consultants on the Conquest 
of Cancer. On the assumption that new techniques in cell biology and recent advances in 
treatment had opened up new avenues for improving care, the panel laid out a 
comprehensive vision of a publicly funded cancer response. Their plan contained three 
major components: administration with strong authority, a national plan for a systematic 
attack, and a large increase in resources. They focused largely on applied R&D over basic 
research and recommended centralized planning and program direction by the National 
Cancer Institute (NCI). In fact, the original draft of the Panel’s report made explicit 
comparisons between their proposed program and NASA (though this language was 
eventually modified); NASA had many characteristics they wished to see in a cancer 
program, including independence and direct reporting to the President, clearly defined goals, 
a massive budget, and a systematic R&D approach (McGeary 2003). 
 
There was considerable political momentum behind this idea. In his January 1971 State of 
the Union address, President Nixon called for an appropriation of US$100 million to launch 
the War on Cancer, saying “the time has come in America when the same kind of 
concentrated effort that split the atom and took man to the moon should be turned toward 
conquering this dread disease” (NCI 2006).  
 
The National Cancer Act was signed into law in December 1971. This law gave the director 
of the NCI much broader responsibilities and made the position a presidential appointment, 
with planning authority over all cancer-related activities within the NIH and many other 
government and NGOs. The Act also gave the NCI some authority over surveillance and 
clinical care as well as cancer research, incorporating into the NCI the responsibility to 
rapidly apply existing knowledge to patient care (United States P.L. 92-218, 1971). 
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The law resulted in an immediate and rapid increase in funding for cancer: NCI’s budget 
rose from US$233 million in 1971 to $492 million in 1973 and reached nearly $900 million 
in 1978. The program itself was initiated in a 1973 strategic plan, with the explicit goal of 
“reduc[ing] the incidence, morbidity, and mortality of cancer in humans” (Rettig 1977).  
 
This broad conception of the National Cancer Program as organizer of a coordinated 
national approach quickly faded, however. NCI research expanded greatly in the first few 
years as funding increased, but the reach of the NCI director beyond his own institute did 
not long survive the original legislation, in part because of the demands of running the 
greatly expanded NCI itself. Some interagency committees were set up, but they hardly 
constituted a comprehensive mechanism for coordination and planning. Meanwhile, the 
strategic plan was barely used at all for actual day-to-day management (McGeary 2003; 
Rettig 1977).  
 
Many of the more innovative substantive aspects of the National Cancer Program failed to 
grow at all, arguably because lack of basic knowledge left the program with little useful 
information on care, diagnosis, or treatment to disseminate to clinicians and stymied further 
progress. For instance, at the outset of the War on Cancer the fundamental biochemistry of 
cancer cells and the spread of tumors was largely unknown and the mechanisms of 
chemotherapy drugs remained unclear (President’s Cancer Panel 1999). Little distinction 
was made between the majority of cancers and those about which enough was known to 
benefit from a planned program (such as Hodgkin’s disease). The project was often 
criticized on these grounds, as well as for the perception that it was somehow betraying the 
NIH mission, which was seen as protecting basic research from being bound to specific 
goals.  
 
In 1993, the House appropriations subcommittee noted that since 1971 more than US$23 
billion had been appropriated for cancer activities at NCI (McGeary 2003). Yet age-
adjusted mortality due to cancer in 1994 was 6.0% higher than in 1970, reflecting the same 
steady increase that had been seen since the 1950s. Important declines in some cancers were 
attributed to reduced cigarette smoking and improved screening procedures, but new 
therapies were seen as having very little effect (Bailar and Gornik 1997). In general, the 
sheer complexity of the cancer problem and lack of knowledge about which areas would 
reward more research are seen as the major roadblocks to achieving the ambitious goals of 
the 1971 act. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
 
It is of course impossible to draw definitive conclusions about mission mode from the 
success or failure of two or even a small number of examples, given the myriad ways that 
each differs from the others and the inescapable historical contingencies. Moreover, 
missions can fail because the problem they set out to solve is insoluble, because they are 
poorly implemented or insufficiently funded, or because mission mode is not the 
appropriate approach to the problem in the first place. Our focus is on the third reason for 
failure, and in this section we will propose two criteria for deciding whether mission mode 
is appropriate for a particular R&D challenge, using the two case studies to illustrate our 
arguments. We then ask whether the search for HIV vaccines meets our proposed criteria. 
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We begin by asking why the War on Cancer failed. Two very different types of explanation 
have been given. According to some, it failed because it was never really implemented as a 
mission, despite the ritual invocation of the moon landing and the Manhattan Project by its 
backers. To start, its goals were too many and too diffuse. Not only did the initiative take 
on prevention as well as treatment, it also aimed to improve the use of existing tools at the 
same time as it sought new ones. This all-encompassing vision is clearly very different from 
the tightly defined goals of the successful missions and surely made it far more difficult to 
break the problem into pieces and assign responsibilities. Perhaps if the initiative had 
restricted itself to the search for a cure, it could have more closely resembled its models. 
Second, the War on Cancer was mostly fought in many small, independent labs rather than 
in a few large facilities, by academic researchers motivated by curiosity and publication, 
making centralized control much harder. And the NCI’s ability to provide the strong central 
control required by mission mode was apparently compromised by excessive bureaucratic 
responsibilities and unclear or inadequate authority. Finally—and ironically (see below) — 
some have argued that it focused too much on basic rather than applied research, thereby 
violating the fourth criterion for mission mode. 
 
An alternative explanation is that the War on Cancer failed because it tried to apply mission 
mode to a problem for which it was not suited. According to this line of argument, not 
enough was known about cancer at the time to define a clear way forward and thus to reap 
the benefits of a highly structured, disciplined approach. Unlike the challenge of building the 
bomb in 1940s or of putting a man on the moon, the problem of curing cancer could not be 
broken into a small number of essentially engineering challenges. This conclusion would 
imply that the research funded by the War on Cancer was actually too applied and that 
more basic research was needed to guide the choice of approaches and to suggest new, 
previously unsuspected approaches.14  
 
Both explanations for the failure of the War on Cancer surely have elements of truth, but if 
it is true that the problem itself was not appropriate for mission mode, the effort would 
probably have failed even if it had been better implemented. The contrast between the state 
of knowledge at the time the War on Cancer was launched and the far better defined 
challenges facing the Manhattan Project prompts us to propose a general principle: mission 
mode is appropriate only when the path to success is relatively clear. There need not be 
consensus on a single approach; the Manhattan Project pursued several approaches to 
uranium enrichment simultaneously. But the set of viable approaches needs to be small and 
well defined.  
 
Focus, discipline, and coordination are surely desirable things. What then is the danger of 
going to mission mode too soon? In essence, the dilemma is that concentrating on one or a 
small number of approaches inevitably means abandoning others, including new ones that 
might have arisen from exploratory work (which a more narrow focus might curtail). This 
is particularly true when research is still at an early, more basic stage. The kinds of 
exploration that will yield the most useful new insights cannot be predicted and often 
                                            
14 There is of course no guarantee that this alternative would have succeeded either. We now, finally, 
understand a great deal about the biological processes that go awry in cancer, but it’s still not clear 
how to translate this knowledge into treatments. Also, the basic research that gave us this 
understanding might not have been possible in the 1970s, when the techniques of modern molecular 
genetics were not yet in hand. 
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“The organizational structure that will work for 
HIV vaccines is not predictable. Ideas ‘out of left 
field’ are going to be the most useful.” 
 
“Most breakthroughs in immunology have come 
from different groups coming together and 
feeling some mobility between disciplines.” 
appear highly serendipitous in retrospect. Thus the chance of a breakthrough may be 
greatest when researchers are allowed to pursue many different paths, most of which will 
lead nowhere. (In fact, our current understanding of cancer processes comes in large part 
from basic research on yeast, fruit flies, and viruses.) Moreover, an open, unstructured 
environment is most conducive to new ideas and to avoiding groupthink. For these reasons, 
a highly decentralized system relying to a substantial degree on individual curiosity, for all 
its apparent inefficiency, is probably the best way to pursue new understanding and 
fundamental innovation.  
 
This kind of argument is familiar not only from the world of academic research, but from 
the theory of capitalism. Market competition is thought to be more likely than central 
planning to produce desirable outcomes, including innovation, in part because no planner 
can have enough information or sufficiently reliable judgment to outperform the combined 
efforts of many independent decision-makers. The analogy is imprecise, of course, and only 
an analogy; our argument here is about the advantages of dispersed decision-making, not 
about the relative strengths of the public and private sectors. 
 
We argue, therefore, that there is an unavoidable trade-off between the efficiency of mission 
mode and the greater innovative potential of a more dispersed, less structured organization 
of R&D, and that the choice between the two modes should depend in part on whether 
enough is known about the problem and its possible solutions that the way forward is clear. 
To put it differently, what matters is whether rapid progress in following up on existing 
ideas is more important than generating new ideas.  
 
It’s worth clarifying that what matters in deciding whether a particular challenge is 
appropriate for mission mode is not whether there’s confidence that success is possible 
(although this may be necessary for obtaining funding and sustaining political commitment) 
but whether the way forward is sufficiently clear. For example, the U.S. launched the 
Manhattan Project with no certainty of success. The choice of a highly centralized structure 
for the initiative was nonetheless justified because the necessary tasks and plausible 
approaches could be clearly defined.  
 
Our second criterion concerns the intrinsic 
scale of the activities necessary to reach the 
goal. Most of the critical tasks faced by the 
Manhattan Project were irreducibly large 
in scale, requiring enormous facilities. 
Similarly, the moon mission involved 
designing, building, and testing huge 
rockets. This kind of work must be done 
by large, highly structured teams. Moreover, at most a few different approaches can be 
pursued at once. In contrast, much of cancer research is relatively small in scale, involving 
bench research, experiments on small animals, or relatively small clinical trials. This kind of 
work can be done in many places at once, and many approaches can be pursued at the same 
time. Thus if the necessary activities are intrinsically large in scale, one is obliged to adopt 
mission mode, whether or not the nature of the problem calls for it in other respects. 
Dispersed small-scale activities don’t require highly structured management, and indeed 
probably make it difficult, as the War on Cancer demonstrated. 
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We argue, then, that the appropriateness of mission mode depends on two considerations: 
the nature of the remaining challenges (is the path forward clear?) and the nature of the 
necessary work (does it require large-scale facilities or processes?).  
 
Implications for HIV vaccine development 
 
With these general considerations in mind, we now ask whether greater centralization and 
focus of R&D—mission mode—would likely speed progress toward an HIV vaccine.  
 
The first of our proposed criteria for adopting mission mode is clarity of the way forward. 
In our judgment, there is at present no consensus on this point for HIV vaccines. On one 
hand, there is broad agreement that refinement and testing of DNA and viral vector T-cell 
vaccines, of the kinds now in clinical trials, should continue. At the same time, there are 
strong arguments for renewed efforts to find a way to stimulate robust antibody responses 
and improved cellular immune responses to control infection. One promising approach 
involves systematic identification and characterization of naturally occurring broadly 
neutralizing antibodies, coupled to high-throughput screening for immunogens that can 
elicit them, with continued screening in parallel for immunogens to elicit cellular immune 
responses. Several new initiatives will focus on this kind of work, including the 
Collaboration for AIDS Vaccine Discovery (CAVD), CHAVI, and IAVI’s Neutralizing 
Antibody Consortium (NAC) (see the Introduction for descriptions of these initiatives). 
IAVI is also considering a large-scale research effort, the AIDS Vaccine R&D Institute, to 
pursue these more systematic, larger-scale approaches.  
 
These initiatives are important and promising, but success is far from certain. We believe 
that substantial resources must remain available for exploring other avenues, including ones 
that cannot yet be precisely defined, and that there is a real risk of narrowing the field’s 
focus too much. Support for “industrial’ screening efforts, consortia, and other large-scale 
initiatives should be balanced by support for small-scale, diverse research in other areas. In 
the face of uncertainty, pursuing many approaches at once may be the best policy over the 
long run. 
 
 
Box 4. New technologies in vaccine R&D 
 
The past few decades have seen a revolution in techniques for studying and manipulating 
cellular and biochemical processes, beginning with the elucidation of the structure of DNA 
and continuing with the development of recombinant DNA techniques and genome 
sequencing. These new techniques have created opportunities for entirely new vaccine 
designs. For instance, recombinant technology allows viral or bacterial proteins to be 
produced in vitro and has led to vaccines and vaccine candidates based on viral vectors, virus-
like particles, and plasmid DNA. Moreover, new techniques have greatly increased our 
understanding of the immune system.  
 
The power of these new techniques has also encouraged a shift in the basic strategy of drug 
and vaccine development, as the idea of rational design of interventions based on molecular 
knowledge of diseases and disease organisms has become more and more compelling. 
Although this approach has succeeded spectacularly in some areas, including the design of 
HIV drugs, some have argued that it has distorted the effort to find a vaccine, leading 
researchers to disdain traditional empirical approaches in favor of untested strategies (Cohen 
2001).  
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In thinking about the right balance between efficiency and innovation, it is useful to 
distinguish between true mission mode—which implies a central authority with the power 
to impose a choice of research priorities—and essentially voluntary measures that enhance 
cooperation without posing a significant risk to independent initiative. Most of the 
measures advocated by the Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise, such as shared reagents, 
standards, and data analysis to ensure comparability, would fall in the latter class, as would 
measures to remove unnecessary obstacles to collaboration. These measures would 
undoubtedly be very useful for ensuring efficient comparisons of different approaches. 
 
In contrast, creating a single body that had the authority to decide which vaccine candidates 
would be allowed to progress to the next stage of clinical trials or that could reallocate 
resources toward a limited number of applied or basic research priorities would be a step 
toward full mission mode. Although the integration of laboratories and the creation of 
teams focused on specific goals could make vital contributions, they should be seen as 
components of a diverse global effort. 
 
Are the activities required to develop an HIV vaccine sufficiently large scale to satisfy the 
second criterion for mission mode? The answer depends on the stage of development. Basic 
research, candidate development, and early-stage clinical trials are not in general “big 
science,” although some proposed 
approaches to high-throughput 
immunogen screening require larger 
investments and greater centralization than 
traditional bench science. In contrast, 
traditional vaccine efficacy trials are by 
their nature large, highly structured 
undertakings involving thousands of 
subjects and costing tens of millions of 
dollars. Trial capacity is clearly limited 
and will remain so even with substantial efforts to support new sites in the developing 
world. The emergence of new prevention technologies, continuing controversies over trial 
ethics, and declining HIV incidence in many regions are likely to make trials even larger and 
reduce the number of viable sites further.  
 
Late-stage HIV vaccine trials thus do appear to meet the scale criterion for mission mode, 
and there is a compelling argument for adopting a more systematic mechanism for choosing 
which trials to conduct. The argument for more rational selection of candidates for large 
trials is reinforced by the fact that failed trials may erode public support. For this reason, 
trial capacity can be thought of as a commons shared by the HIV vaccine community, 
requiring joint management and regulation.  
 
The need for centralized allocation of scarce trial capacity might be partially alleviated by 
the use of small screening test of concept (STOC) trials to provide fast, efficient interim 
assessments of candidate vaccines. These trials would measure whether candidates reduced 
viral load in participants who become infected, but would not attempt to determine if they 
prevented infection. Moreover, since these trials would not be intended to support licensure, 
they could aim for a less statistically robust result and could be much smaller and simpler 
than Phase III trials. In principle, several candidates could be pushed through STOC trials 
relatively quickly and their results compared. This approach could both ease pressure on 
“In clinical trials, we need to ‘fail’ to see what 
does not work. There needs to be more 
coordination between the EU, NIH, and IAVI, 
each of which is separately building capacity in 
clinical trials overseas, for example. In any case 
this is a practical issue, since none of these alone 
is enough to show the results unambiguously. 
Trials need to be standardized, and we need 
comparative trials.” 
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trial capacity and provide an agreed basis for  deciding which candidates should move 
forward to larger trials. 
  
At the same time, some measure of central control may still be required to ensure that 
sponsors are willing to subject their candidates to this type of head-to-head comparison. In 
addition, whatever the mechanism by which candidates enter Phase III, high-level 
coordination for efficacy trials is likely desirable. By standardizing protocols and outcome 
measures, greater coordination of trials would allow candidates to be compared more 
directly. Similarly, process development and manufacturing, which are closely linked to 
efficacy trials by regulatory considerations, are relatively large-scale activities. 
 
We conclude, then, that the HIV vaccine 
field should adopt some of the features of 
mission mode in later stages of 
development, in particular by imposing 
greater control over clinical trials. In contrast, this kind of organization is probably not 
appropriate for earlier stages of HIV vaccine R&D, though some relatively large-scale 
initiatives could be included in a diverse mix of approaches. Although progress toward 
certain intermediate objectives could be accelerated by more structure and central authority, 
the way forward is not clear enough to risk discouraging innovation and the pursuit of 
other, currently less popular approaches. Some more modest steps to ease collaboration, 
however, could speed progress with little risk to innovation. 
“You can’t get creativity from massive 
organizations. But you need a massive approach 
for some issues. So for AIDS, you need both.”
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IV. Conclusions 
 
Progress toward an HIV vaccine will depend not only on resources and science, but on the 
organization and management of the R&D effort. Our review of the history of vaccine 
development and of large centrally managed initiatives like the Manhattan Project supports 
several conclusions. 
 
 Some vaccines were developed primarily in the private sector and some in the public 
sector, and in other cases the public sector handed over primary responsibility to 
industry at an intermediate stage of development. Although over the entire period 
since 1945 no particular model has predominated, a standard model of vaccine 
development has emerged over the last few decades, in which promising candidates 
are developed by university labs and biotech firms and then licensed to large 
pharmaceutical companies for clinical trials, licensing, and manufacture. A few large 
firms now possess a near monopoly on the skills required for licensing trials and 
manufacturing process development. These steps in vaccine development have been 
made much more challenging by more stringent safety regulation. 
 
 Although research and innovation occur primarily in universities, the biotechnology 
industry is increasingly involved in translating breakthroughs into candidate 
products. Engaging this segment of industry, which might respond to incentives that 
would be less attractive to big firms, should be a high priority, along with continued 
support for university research. Although industry has the most recent experience in 
large-scale vaccine testing, the public and nonprofit sectors retain (or have regained) 
the capacity to manage trials, especially in developing countries and especially for 
HIV vaccines. This capacity should be strengthened, as it may be needed for other 
vaccines as well. The final stages of HIV vaccine development (process development, 
manufacturing, and licensing) are best carried out by industry. It should not be 
difficult to interest firms in a candidate that has proven itself in trials, but if 
necessary the private sector could be engaged on a contractual basis. 
 
 The Manhattan Project and the moon landing demonstrated the power of 
centralized management (mission mode), while the War on Cancer suggested that 
this model may not be appropriate for all R&D challenges. The efficiency of mission 
mode in accomplishing well-defined tasks must be balanced against the risk of 
suppressing innovation. The appropriateness of mission mode depends on the clarity 
of the way forward and on the intrinsic scale of the required activities. 
 
 The case for mission mode in early HIV vaccine R&D is equivocal; the necessary 
activities are often rather small in scale and the way forward is much debated. There 
is a risk that too much centralization could encourage groupthink and stymie 
creativity. On the other hand, some of the most promising approaches to the field's 
critical challenges involve larger-scale techniques and greater coordination among 
laboratories. Thus, it makes sense to include some promising larger-scale 
initiatives—and aspects of mission mode—within a diverse portfolio of approaches. 
For later stages of HIV vaccine development, the case for greater coordination is 
strong, because advanced efficacy trials are unavoidably large undertakings, capacity 
is limited, and decisions made by one developer affect others. 
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Appendix I: Stages of R&D for innovative vaccines since 1945, by 
sector  
 
Sector 
 
  Public (government 
and/or military) 
Academic 
Private  Nonprofit/Other  
 
Type of vaccine Applied 
research and 
vaccine design 
Development 
and trials 
Manufacturing 
and licensure 
Licensure 
date 
Influenza    1945 
Mumps, inactivated    1951 
Cholera, inactivated    1952 
 Polio, inactivated 
   
1955 
Adenovirus    1957 
Polio, oral trivalent  1963 
 Measles, live 
 
  1963 
Mumps, live    1967 
Rubella   1969 
Anthrax   
 
1970 
 Meningococcal A and C, 
polysaccharide   
 1975 
 Pneumococcal 
polysaccharide  
  1977 
Adenovirus, live oral type 4 
and 7 
   1980 
 Hepatitis B, plasma-derived 
 
  1981 
  Typhoid, live oral Ty21a 
  
 1989 
Hib polysaccharide    1985 
 Hepatitis B, recombinant 
 
  1986 
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Sector 
 
 Academic  Public (government 
and/or military) 
Private  Nonprofit/Other  
 
Type of vaccine Applied 
research and 
vaccine design 
Development 
and trials 
Manufacturing 
and licensure 
Licensure 
date 
 Hib conjugate 
 
  1988 
Meningococcal B and C    1989 
 DTaP 
  
 1991 
Hepatitis A  
 
 1991 
 Japanese Encephalitis B, 
killed    
1992 
Typhoid Vi polysaccharide, 
inactivated 
   1992 
Cholera, live oral 
   
1994 
 Varicella, live 
 
  1995 
Lyme disease 
 
  1998 
 Rotavirus 
  
  1998 
Pneumo conjugate, 7-valent    2000 
 Influenza, live attenuated 
intranasal   
 2003 
 HPV 
 
  2006 
Rotavirus, live oral 
pentavalent 
  2006 
 Zoster 
 
  2006 
 
Source: Blume 2005; Galambos and Sewell 1995; Hilleman 1998, 1999, 2000; Hoyt 2006; 
Immunization Action Coalition 2003, 2006; Mitchell et al. 1993; National Immunization Program 
2006; National Vaccine Advisory Committee 1999; NIAID 2002; Pérez et al. 1999; Plotkin 2005; 
Rader 2006 
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Appendix II: List of Interviewees  
 
Name Title/Affiliation Location 
Jorge Beloqui Director 
Grupo de Incentivo à Vida  
Brazil 
Ben Cheng Project Manager, Forum for Collaborative HIV Research  
Center for Health Services Policy and Research, George Washington 
Univ.  
United States 
Jon Cohen Science writer 
Science magazine 
United States 
Michel de Wilde Executive Vice President, Research and Development 
Aventis Pasteur 
United States 
Emilio Emini Executive Vice President, Vaccine Research and Development 
Wyeth 
United States 
Jose Esparza Senior Advisor, HIV Vaccines 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
United States 
Ian Frazer University of Queensland Centre for Immunology and Cancer Research 
at the Princess Alexandra Hospital 
Australia 
Jaap Goudsmit Chief Scientific Officer 
Crucell NV 
Netherlands 
Michel Greco Former President, COO, and Deputy CEO 
Aventis Pasteur 
France 
Ian Gust Professorial Fellow 
Department of Microbiology & Immunology, University of Melbourne  
Australia 
Carole Heilman Director 
Division of Microbiology & Infectious Diseases, NIAID 
United States 
Peggy Johnston Director, Vaccine and Prevention Research Program (VPRP) 
Division of AIDS, NIAID 
United States 
Pontiano Kaleebu Principal Investigator 
Uganda Virus Research Institute 
Uganda 
Donald Light Professor of Comparative Health Care 
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey 
United States 
Neal Nathanson Associate Dean for Global Health Programs 
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine 
United States 
Stanley Plotkin Medical and Scientific Advisor 
Aventis Pasteur 
France 
Sai Prasad Head of Business Development 
Bharat Biotech International 
India 
Rino Rappuoli Global Head, Vaccines Research 
Novartis 
Italy 
Douglas Richman Director, Center for AIDS Research 
VA Medical Center, San Diego  
United States 
Philip K. Russell Professor Emeritus 
Johns Hopkins School of Public Health 
United States 
Pradeep Seth President 
Seth Research Foundation 
India 
Jerald Sadoff President and CEO 
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation 
United States 
Edmund Tramont Director 
Division of AIDS, NIAID 
United States 
Stephen Udem Senior Vice President of Vaccine Development and Chief Scientific 
Officer  
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative 
United States 
Bruce Walker Director 
Partners AIDS Research Center, Massachusetts General Hospital 
United States 
Mitchell Warren Executive Director 
AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition 
United States 
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Appendix III: Interview guide and questionnaire  
 
Goals of the interview 
As you know from prior communication, I am performing a study for the International 
AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI). The work will describe organizational and institutional 
features in vaccine research over time and will draw some inferences about how vaccine 
R&D efforts for cases such as HIV/AIDS can be improved and sped up. Today’s interview is 
only one among many data sources that will be used for the study.  
 
This interview has two aims: to explore the organization of research and development 
efforts for vaccines, including various actors and capabilities, and to understand the 
changing institutional arrangements for vaccine R&D over time broadly understood to 
include financing, social support, regulatory and other “rules” , “norms” or “practice” that 
affect what actors are involved, and speed with which a goal is reached that most in the 
research community agree is desirable (such as an HIV vaccine). 
 
Anonymity 
I intend to publish results without any attribution, meaning that any statements you make 
will not be publicly linked with identifying characteristics. Specific data will be published 
only if the reader would be unable to make a definitive link to a person or organization, and 
published comments will be reported anonymously, e.g., “a senior manager indicated 
that…”. You should be reassured that even in the collection and analysis of data, the project 
ensures full confidentiality for your views so that you feel comfortable to fully share them 
during the interview.  
 
Answering the questions 
I will pose 4 open-ended but structured questions, common to all the interviewees. Under 
each question are several related sub-questions, and I am likely to also ask a few additional 
short questions that will be more specific to your expertise and professional history. The 
interview should take approximately 45 minutes to an hour.  
  
Please answer the associated questions as best you can, based on your own experiences and 
understanding of the institutional and organizational changes in R&D that they represent. 
For each answer, please be as specific as possible, with examples, dates, typologies, and 
identification of organizations and institutional settings in which the vaccine research or 
development occurred. 
 
If you do not know the answer to any question, please indicate this. In addition, please note 
that you are under no obligation to answer any of these questions if you do not desire to. 
Please explain why you do not wish to answer a question if you are willing to share the 
reason. 
  
The questions 
Introduction: Please briefly describe how you came to be involved with vaccine R&D, 
and/or what brought you to the AIDS field. 
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1. Science: Uniqueness and commonalities of HIV:  
 
(a) What vaccines can provide useful or instructive comparisons to HIV vaccines? 
For example, can hepatitis C vaccine goals be contrasted for scientific, 
organizational or institutional insights? What about earlier vaccines? 
 
2. Links between science and organization (Form and function):  
 
(a) Advantages of certain forms and functions: Is there a defining difference in the 
way vaccine research or development is conducted in different organizational 
forms? What exactly is different between vaccine research conducted in a 
university setting, an army-led/national research lab, or in the private for-profit 
sector? What about vaccine development? 
(b) Two particular organizational forms: What are the primary benefits and 
drawbacks to (i) large-scale, coordinated vaccine efforts and to (ii) investigator-
driven, individual research programs?  
(c) Unique functions for certain forms? Which elements of the scientific work 
specifically related to HIV vaccines cannot be done in the public research 
domain? Which cannot be done in the private company domain? Why?  
 
3. Institutional history: 
 
(a) Different institutional models: Assuming for the moment that one can make the 
distinction, are the ties between “R” and “D” and “manufacture” differently 
coordinated in Europe than in the U.S.? What, if anything, can European vaccine 
scientists accomplish that cannot be done here? Why? What can they not do that 
U.S. vaccine scientists can? Why? What about organization and institutional 
models of vaccine R&D in Japan and other parts of Asia? What makes the U.S. 
vaccine R&D “style,” however you want to define it, different: funding, 
regulation, NIH history and practice, capabilities of private for-profit 
companies, other? 
(b) Other organizations, Not-for-profits, the Army, etc.: Some not-for-profits, such 
as the Institute for One World Health, have restructured some aspects of R&D. 
Others, such as the army, have historically performed activities of both academia 
and the private, for-profit sector. What is the role for such organizations, distinct 
from universities and private companies, in vaccine R&D? Has this has changed 
over time? How? 
(c) The role of IP: Do changes in intellectual property rules affect the speed of HIV 
vaccine R&D? If yes, how exactly?  
 
4. Coordinated efforts in R&D:  
 
(a) “Mission-mode” R&D: What are the primary benefits/drawbacks of R&D 
efforts that combine aspects of both large-scale, coordinated vaccine efforts and 
investigator-driven, individual research programs? How do these change based 
on different alignments within these “mission-mode” programs (e.g., Manhattan 
Project, Human Genome Project, Moon Mission etc.)? 
(b) Avoiding duplication, enhancing integration? The Dale and Betty Bumpers 
Vaccine Research Center at the NIH is another model of pursuing HIV research, 
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as are IAVI and various other initiatives worldwide. Why not one “Mission-
mode” approach to HIV vaccines—what would it take for all these different 
initiatives to be integrated? How (if at all) does the international nature of 
HIV/AIDS affect the ways in which national resources are allocated, given that 
prior “mission-mode” efforts have been primarily at a national level?  
(c) Attracting the “best and brightest”? Do the “best and brightest” come to vaccine 
R&D? What prevents having them all in one place working on various 
approaches to HIV vaccine R&D? Can their professional paths be differently 
structured to speed a vaccine? 
(d) Present moment in national histories: Are there specific opportunities now for 
“mission-mode” work that might allow this integration? How is this different 
from previous periods of U.S. or other history? What needs to be done, and by 
whom, for this to occur? 
 
Completion and additional points 
I have completed my prepared questions. Are there any other thoughts you wish to share on 
pertinent issues I may not here raised here? Do you have suggestions of other 
people/organizations that could provide further insights? (Suggestions could include those 
outside the HIV or vaccine R&D fields, if you think they have some experience or 
perspective that may assist me in this study.) 
 
Follow-up 
If we could not finish in the allotted time, or if you wish to comment further for any reason, 
could you please let me know by indicating if you are available for a follow-up interview by 
telephone? 
 
Thank you very much for your assistance. IAVI will be in touch with you with the 
completed report of the study. 
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